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ABSTRACT

Much scholarship is dedicated to Melville’s religious themes, and other scholarship
carefully analyzes the innovative formal techniques used by Melville, such as biblical allusion,
digressive essays, and philosophical musings imbedded in fiction. However, religious analysis
often turns to biographical interpretations of Melville’s own beliefs, and formal analysis tends to
highlight Melville’s idiosyncrasies rather than determine their function. This thesis uses the
Bakhtinian concepts of dialogism and polyphony to show that Melville’s poetic techniques create
open texts, allowing readers to freely engage with multiple religious views that are equally valid,
though not equally beneficial. Anticipating the methodologies of agnosticism and pragmatism,
Moby-Dick exemplifies an attitude of cheerful agnosticism, whereas Melville’s final major work,
Clarel, exemplifies the frustrations of uncertainty. A primarily formal analysis allows scholars to
view Melville both conforming and breaking out of expected religious attitudes in the
nineteenth-century, without considering Melville a prophet of twentieth-century literary
attitudes.
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EPIGRAPHS
“I think also that I have the Spirit of God.”
Saint Paul, 1 Corinthians 7:40
“I too am uncertain.”
-Herman Melville, Marginal Annotation to 1 Corinthians 7:40
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Across the span of his career, Herman Melville moved from popular novelist, to failed
novelist, to moderately successful novelist, again to failed novelist, and finally to failed poet. The
range of Melville’s success parallels the wide-ranging moods of his works, from his successful
first novel, Typee (1846), with its buoyant travelogue style, to his droning, tortured, 18,000 line
final major work, Clarel (1876). One of the most apparent fluctuations during his career is
religion. The ebb and flow between faith and doubt is captured by Nathaniel Hawthorne, who
wrote that Melville “can neither believe, nor be comfortable in his unbelief; and he is too honest
and courageous not to try to do one or the other” (Journals 628). Melville’s writing continually
engages with religious questions that neither settle for orthodox certainty or heterodox
abandonment—in other words, agnosticism.
This thesis investigates how Melville portrays agnostic thought through the poetic
techniques of two major works. Using primarily formal analysis, this work demonstrates that
Melville moved from a more optimistic portrayal of agnosticism exemplified in Moby-Dick, to a

more troubling pessimistic agnosticism reflected in Clarel. Mikhail Bakhtin’s concepts of
polyphony and dialogism are particularly helpful for understanding Melville’s portrayals of
agnosticism. Bakhtin’s formal theories are textually grounded, but also aptly describe the shifts
in nineteenth-century society (the rise of industrialization, the newspaper democratizing
knowledge, and dramatic political shifts) that allowed writings which allow open-ended poetics,
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which are not didactic apologetics for particular worldviews. Melville’s works instead ask
readers to contemplate their own beliefs in conjunction with Melville’s many characters.
Analyzing Melville’s formal approach to prose and poetry demonstrates that scholars of
American literature and religion can successfully move beyond historical or sociological
readings applied to literary texts and instead gain insights of historical, sociological, and
religious attitudes from literary texts. Abram C. Van Engen, a scholar working in American
literature and religion, writing in 2017, argues that the field of American Literature and Religion
tends to “front load history and explain broad religious contexts before turning to more and more
close readings” and calls for reevaluating the relationship between religion and literature “not as
causal (from religion to literature) … but as mutually constitutive” (“Three Questions” 217-18).
Engen admits that he too operates from a causal framework with historical schemas, saying
“[t]his seems to be the way of things” (217). He isn’t sure if turning to close formal readings is
the correct shift to make, but rather offers it as a possible starting point. My thesis partially
answers that call to begin with formalism, but makes the alternative, or additional claim, that
literature not only reflects historical moods, but after a close, critical read, can break out of the
arbitrary confinements that history places on individual’s emotions and attitudes towards
religion. The binary between our historical-religious schemas reading literature and our analysis
of literature writing histories, must be equally utilized.

Herman Melville’s works are an excellent case-study in this idea of literature breaking
out of the confinements of history. The strangeness, beauty, and ambiguity of Melville’s works

2

often lead them to be labeled “proto-modern”1 or “proto-postmodern”2 by scholars interested in
genre and aesthetics, while historical readings attempt to explain their idiosyncrasies by putting
forth historical events or movements that perhaps spawned the attitudes presented in a text.
Between these two extremes, we find that they are both true, and few would deny this in theory,
but the existing scholarship lacks this equality between theory, history, and the text. That
Melville reacted to historical events is true without a doubt. In fact, using historical data, such as
what literature influenced Melville or collecting biographical details of his family’s religious
views, help explain certain recurring ideas and themes in his works. However, since Melville’s
ideas, represented through his characters, do not easily fall into schemas of religious history in
the nineteenth century, scholars instead need to use language that is not typical of the era to
accurately describe Melville’s texts for modern audiences. It’s extremely difficult, for instance,
to historically place Clarel, an 18,000 line poem about faith and doubt that doesn’t advocate for
either faith or doubt, into the scholarly conversation of American Literature and Religion. Why
read or write about an absurdly long and consistently depressing poem if it doesn’t contribute to
either side of a nineteenth-century historical debate? For a post-modern writer, to leave a central
thematic question open-ended is not surprising. But how could Melville, writing in the
nineteenth-century, not answer the question he sets out to answer, leaving it uncomfortably
open? As I will show, Melville scholars still suggest there are concrete arguments for belief,

albeit hidden underneath the surface of what the text says for itself. These readings, however, are

Tim Armstrong: “Melville is a consistently experimental writer, offering a restless expansion of the
possibilities of genre in the novel” (Modernism: A Cultural History 23).
1

Ihab Hassan: Moby-Dick is “written in mockery of system[s], written against any effort to harmonize
discordant elements, against any mythic or metaphoric scheme” (“POSTmodernISM” 15).
2
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clouded by moving from “the top down,” that is to say, they begin with a historical, religious, or
philosophical schema, and from there, point out how Melville fits based on the text.
The binary between historical and close text-based readings is not solvable. So long as
we think of novels and poems as historical objects, which they are, then including historical
context feels obligatory. Context strengthens rhetorical arguments, helping them stay grounded
in reality rather than theory (an arbitrary binary we can’t quite let go of either). That said, the job
of the literary scholar is not to write history. That so many books on specific periods of
American Literature and Religion inevitably end up spending more time explaining history and
historiography rather than analyzing texts themselves attests to the primacy of history over
textual analysis.3 This privilege, or hierarchy, of establishing the religious-historical context
before performing formal readings, prevents texts from teaching us about the historical moment
in which they were written from the point of view of an individual artist, not a philosopher,
theologian or historian. Similarly, privileging historical context creates a sense of obligation to
fit an artist’s non-conforming ideas into an established historical schema created by the critic.
In response, this thesis blends two modes of interpretation: historical and formal analysis.
However, history is not presented as a detailed schema. It is utilized only to enhance an
understanding of formal techniques that set Melville apart from his contemporaries, for instance,

3

Books that give general overviews of American literature and religion, not focusing on a single text, but
common threads between texts, is specifically what I’m referring to. Two examples of what I am
responding to: Tracy Fessenden’s Culture and Redemption (2007), which traces American literature and
religion from Puritan writings to Fitzgerald. She sees “hegemonic power of appeals to a Protestant
consensus in American public life” (213) as the primary historical basis of American literature and
religion. American literature responding to or against this Protestant majority. Dawn Coleman’s
Preaching and the Rise of the American Novel offers a similar interpretation. Coleman establishes
historically, in the first two chapters, the importance of preaching in American culture. Coleman argues
that any subversive literature dealing with American religion tried “resisting preaching through mockery,
irony, and satire” but “they also envied it, identified with it, and appropriated it as a distinctive and
authoritative mode of addressing audiences” (4). Their section on Melville is briefly dealt with later.
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his wide-ranging literary influences.4 Likewise, formalism is not used to make Melville a prophet
of later ideas, but rather reinforce his unique representations of religious thought that disrupt our
notions of what nineteenth-century American literature, and by extension American literature in
general, can say about religion at any given period. If scholars lessen the pressure to present
entire historical systems before analysis, then perhaps the texts themselves will enlighten how
individuals experienced and dealt with religious ideas in unique ways.

The Basic History and Context of Melville’s Writings
Taking what scholars have written about Melville’s life and influences, we can find
helpful explanations for how Moby-Dick and Clarel function in response to their environment. In
addition, however, we should also see how they break out of literary expectations. A brief
overview of Melville’s career and the major contexts of his writings shows Melville’s both
conformity and experimentalism. There is no schema to the brief historical sketch presented,
only general facts left uninterpreted as much as possible.
Melville’s first wholly fictional work, Mardi (1849), wrestles with the changes in thought
during the late 1840s. Seemingly a standard sea-faring story, it morphs into an allegory of both
religious, philosophical, and political ideologies. Characters visit various islands that represent

new philosophical and religious ideas rooted in skepticism, such as “the accuracy of perception,
the foundations of selfhood, the scope of human reason, and the bases for moral judgment” (Lee

4

This necessitates biographical knowledge of what books Melville read and annotated; it is unavoidably
historical.
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113). Melville’s desire to explore religious possibilities that may undermine traditional
worldviews, is a continual theme throughout his career.
Although published only two years later, Moby-Dick (1851) takes the allusiveness and
encyclopedic nature of Mardi into new formal territory. Through the narrator, Ishmael, MobyDick explores issues of religious plurality and epistemology. Melville’s readings of Shakespeare,
the Bible (Parker 504-506), and philosophical and politically minded books like Carlyle’s Sartor
Resartus and Emerson’s Representative Men (Sealts 59, 67) pushed Melville into dealing with
the same issues as Mardi in new forms. Melville’s celebrated short stories continue these
philosophical themes, and two of his novels, Pierre (1852) and The Confidence-Man (1857)
pushed these musings on philosophical, religious, and existential anxieties to extremes that led to
Melville’s failed career as a novelist.
Between Melville’s final prose work, The Confidence-Man, which came out two years
before Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), and Melville’s long-poem Clarel (1876), significant
changes took place both historically and scholastically. Of course, the American Civil War
altered the landscape of American identity, politics, and religion. But other intellectual changes
between 1857 and 1876, such as the introduction of agnosticism through English thinkers like
T.H. Huxley, the rise of American Unitarianism, and comparative religious scholars like James
Freeman Clarke and Max Müller, altered understandings of truth, making religion more

inclusive. Comparative religious scholars introduced eastern religions, like Buddhism and
Hinduism, along with dead religions like Zoroastrianism and Gnosticism, into the public
consciousness. In 1871, five years before Clarel’s publication, Clarke wrote: “Twenty-five years
ago it was hardly possible to procure any adequate information concerning Brahmanism,
Buddhism, [etc.] … But now…we have ample means of ascertaining the essential facts
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concerning most of these movements” (4). The sudden burst of scholarship surrounding these
religions allowed lay-people to access other cultures and religions, expanding the scope of
religious possibilities; in response to this plurality, agnosticism became an attractive alternative
to absolute belief and non-belief.

Agnosticism and Pragmatism
Throughout this thesis, agnosticism is used in the same sense as its first proponent, T.H.
Huxley. Huxley, in 1869, defined agnosticism through a declaration: “[i]n matters of the
intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration.”
Additionally, the methodological foundation of agnosticism is to “not pretend that conclusions
are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable” (187). Huxley coined the word
“agnosticism” in response to his frustration with atheist’s attempts to topple theism as
irrationally as theist’s attempt to topple atheism.5 Instead of trying to overtake belief with nonbelief or vice versa, Huxley argues that agnosticism stays out of the dichotomy because it is not a
belief “but a method… it is as old as Socrates; as old as the writer who said, 'Try all things, hold
fast by that which is good’” (187). Focusing on epistemological humility, Huxley encourages
individuals to “not be ashamed to look the universe in the face, whatever the future may have in

store for him” (187). Huxley’s agnosticism gives religious belief the possibility of truth. While
Huxley is the figure most associated with agnosticism in the nineteenth-century, the ideas of
agnosticism were not isolated in England. The German-born nineteenth-century comparative

Within the philosophical conversation, “Huxley’s creation of the new term agnosticism was also
intended to signify that his position was to be distinguished from empiricism” (Lightman 27).
5
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religious scholar Max Müller describes himself as agnostic depending on its definition. He
writes, “I am, and always have been, an Agnostic, that is, in relying on nothing but historical
facts and in following reason as far as it will take us… and in never pretending that conclusions
are certain which are not demonstrated” (355). On the other hand, if agnosticism “excludes a
recognition of an eternal reason pervading the natural and moral world… then I am a Gnostic
[not agnostic]” (356). Agnosticism is not a philosophy, but rather, like the scientific method, a
methodology towards truth.
While not a synonym for agnosticism, American pragmatism also sees itself as first and
foremost a methodology, not a new school of thought. James, like Huxley, suggests that
pragmatism is “a new name for some old ways of thinking,” to quote the subtitle of James’ work
Pragmatism (1907). Like agnosticism, James defines pragmatism not as a philosophical system,
but as “a method only,” intended to open the “possibilities of nature… against dogma,
artificiality, and the presence of finality in truth” (Pragmatism 71). Pragmatism begins with
presenting a new definition of truth that evades rationalism and irrationalism equally.
James responds to the perennial question, “What is truth?” with the following answer:
“True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify” (Pragmatism 141).
Although seemingly an empiricist approach, James includes this caveat: an individual must ask,
“what concrete difference will [any belief] being true make in any one’s actual life? How will the

truth be realized?” (141). James’ entire work Pragmatism is a defense against the charge that
pragmatism is merely wishful thinking or relativism, and other works like his essay “The Will to
Believe,” attempt to show how this methodology can apply to truths both scientific and religious.
Religious belief and its connection to human psychology fascinated James. His essay
“The Will to Believe” is, he argues, “an essay in justification of faith, a defense of our right to
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adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect
may not have been coerced” (1-2). James argues that each individual, because of upbringing,
culture, and personal inclinations, possesses live and dead beliefs, like live or dead wires. If for
instance you ask a white American from the South to “‘be a Mohammedan,’ it is probably a dead
option” because the possibility of suddenly adopting a foreign and unknown belief is unlikely.6
From this, James argues that if religious beliefs are helpful for allowing an individual to cope
with existence, and they provide an inspiration for good morals, then faith is worth adopting. He
summarizes his argument through a quotation of Fitz James Stephen: “‘We do not certainly
know whether there is any right one [truth]. What must we do? Be strong and of a good courage.
Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes’” (31). James, charitable to religious
faith, makes it clear that he “cannot see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for truth-seeking,
or willfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the game” (28). James’ interest in unseen
human drives counters Huxley, a biologist, in their respective attitudes towards the value of
truths not demonstrable by evidence.
Although writing before the coining of “agnosticism” and “pragmatism,” Melville
anticipates both methodologies. This doesn’t make Melville a prophet of Huxley or James, but
rather reinforces the fact that agnosticism and pragmatism, as both Huxley and James remind
their readers, are found throughout the history of theology, philosophy, and literature.

Understanding Melville’s formal techniques and influences reinforce why describing Melville’s
writings as agnostic or pragmatic is not anachronistic. Instead, these familiar words more simply
describe the recurring philosophical and theological attitudes that Melville revamps in the 1850s.

There are many nuances to James’ argument, and his book-length study The Varieties of Religious
Experience investigates these same themes in far more detail.
6
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By using the words “agnostic” and “pragmatic” to describe the methodologies of
characters seeking religious truth in Melville’s works, not Melville himself, the function of the
art becomes clearer. Melville’s art presents multiple characters, ideas, philosophies, and truths
with equal credence. We’ll see how the epistemological focus of Moby-Dick and Clarel is not
which beliefs are "truer than others,” but rather which beliefs are more beneficial. How
Melville’s writings achieve this democratic representation of multiple truths is explored through
analyzing the dialogic poetics in Moby-Dick and Clarel.
Within the realm of American literature and religious scholarship, agnosticism is not
widely discussed. This makes sense on the surface: agnosticism is not a religion. The
methodology of O’Leary’s Thick and Dazzling Darkness (2017) explains this schema. O’Leary’s
book, in his words, “addresses and discusses the ways poets verbalize thoughts and feelings on
the nature of the divine, typically in symbolically rich language” (20). Although this sounds
inclusive of, say, non-organized religious views on religion, he clarifies that the poetry he
analyzes is exclusively religious. He writes, “I follow Jonathan Z. Smith’s definition that religion
is ‘a system of beliefs and practices that are relative to superhuman beings.’… It’s commonplace
nowadays… to trade [the word ‘religion’] for the word, ‘spirituality.’ Spiritual implies personal
beliefs where religious signifies institutional, doctrinal adherence. Throughout this study, I am
referring to religion and not to spirituality” (25). This schema creates some arbitrary decisions

about what constitutes as religious poetry. Whitman’s transcendentalism is associated with
Unitarianism (38) and he calls Eliot’s The Wasteland, written before his conversion to
Christianity, “one of the great apocalyptic poems in Christian Literature” (39). Because
agnosticism is not a traditional religious group, but a religious attitude, scholars in American
literature and religious scholarship hesitate to discuss it. This explains why, in Melville
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scholarship, Melville’s portrayals of religious thought are more associated with Unitarianism;
even though Unitarianism is a more inclusive religious group than, say, Calvinist Protestantism,
it is still organized. However, formally, Melville’s works explore what is more accurately
described as agnosticism, as this thesis shows. And while not an organized group, agnosticism is
still a religious attitude and deserves scholarly attention.
Scholars who overuse Melville’s biography connect Melville’s joyful uncertainty with a
non-religious spirituality (never referred to as agnostic), while Melville’s despairing uncertainty
is associated with the surrender of intellectual pursuits (sometimes described as agnostic, in the
sense of giving up hope for knowledge). This stems, primarily, from an inability to allow the
characters of Melville’s fiction to speak for themselves; the illusion of Melville’s characters
possessing their own consciousnesses separated from their author is one of Melville’s great
stylistic contributions, yet scholars are hesitant to remove the artist from his characters. For
instance, Yothers argues that Melville is "agnostic” when at his most despairing, both poetically
and personally, struggling with alcoholism during the period of writing his final (completed)
novel, The Confidence-Man (Sacred 125). But Yothers argues that Melville is “not a protoatheist or an early agnostic, or a Christian longing for the capacity for belief” but rather “all of
those conflicting things and none” (Sacred 214) when we study all of his works. Agnosticism is
denied to Melville even though Yothers’ phrase “Sacred Uncertainty” describes an agnostic

methodology with an optimistic spiritual twist. Other authors follow this pattern: Bezanson uses
biographical artifacts to argue Melville moves from agnostic intellectual-giving-up, towards
“edur[ing] the overwhelming sense of a shattered vision” (“Historical” 612-13). Similarly,
Joseph Knapp uses Hegelian philosophy to argue Melville’s ultimate theological conclusion is to
endure life despite suffering (119-123), while Stan Goldman invokes existentialism to suggest
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that Melville advocates forcing oneself into religious “belief [that] is not true—not
corresponding with any fact” but nonetheless “help[s] one to strive for a more worthy life” (144).
Using new-historicism, William Potter, comparing Melville to nineteenth-century comparative
religious scholars, suggests that Melville found peace in the “intersympathy of creeds” by simply
portraying religious difference in his works. Potter’s humanist interpretation is essentially
agnostic in definition: "In this lack of resolution between contrary positions, Melville seems to
be emphasizing... a heterodox state of acquired or attainted irresolution. The experience of the
real world breeds religious doubt, but the believer must subject his faith to just this test to
authenticate it” (111-112). What all these readings share, despite their outward differences, is an
attempt to turn Melville into a religious or philosophical teacher. Contrary to this approach, I
suggest that Melville himself does not try to teach the reader anything; instead, the characters of
Melville’s fiction and poetry are dialogic representations of differing beliefs that readers must
choose to accept or criticize. Melville can’t escape favoring certain views more than others, of
course (truly “free” characters are impossible to create). Yet Melville continually places figures
who are humble, earnest, and intellectually rigorous, like Ishmael, above those who either
blindly believe without cause, like Starbuck, or adopt views that drive them towards monomania,
like Ahab.
This thesis analyzes the joyful agnosticism in Moby-Dick and then analyzes the agonizing

agnosticism of Clarel. The two works presented together, show that Melville is capable of
presenting the same ideas with different attitudes. Moby-Dick is cheerful, despite its tragic
ending, because it shows the possibility of a space wherein truths are held in equal regard until
dogmatism drives them to their destruction. On the other hand, Clarel demonstrates that the
utopian vision of complete ecumenical fraternity is impossible so long as the desire for absolute
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certainty exists (which it always will). Both works nonetheless present an agnostic outlook as the
gateway to intellectual humility that prevents monomaniacal dogmatism. Pragmatically, MobyDick highlights the joys of agnosticism while Clarel highlights the loneliness imbedded in
uncertainty. Through formal analysis we can glean how and why Melville portrays the same
agnostic outlook from the perspectives of joy and resignation.
Throughout this work formalism refers to the practice of analyzing how texts work
through their genre, poetic techniques, and language. Formalism is a general term for multiple
schools of thought, mostly New Criticism and Russian Formalism. While New Critics focused
on “the study of literature ‘as literature,’ rather than as language” (Barry 17) and the Russian
Formalists focused on how literary language “has its own characteristic procedures and effects,
and is not just a version of ordinary language” (Barry 164), both are primarily concerned with
“close formal analysis of literature… the belief that the language of literature has its own
characteristic procedures and effects” and that texts use poetic techniques, from linguistic
wordplay to the structure of a plot, to demonstrate how literary works communicate ideas to the
reader (Barry 164). Formalism is an attempt to exegete meaning out of the literal poetic or
structural elements of a text rather than an eisegesis that approaches a text with a certain view in
mind and finding how the text reflects that view. This thesis uses formalism when discussing
how a given text presents itself to the reader, whether that be the layout of the plot in Moby-Dick,

the poetic techniques used in Clarel (rhyme and meter, for instance), or how characters interact
with one another to create dialogue. Russian formalism, because it focuses on the intermixing of
spoken and literary language, provides a textually grounded theory for understanding Melville’s
dialogic poetics.

13

Melville uses dialogic poetics throughout Moby-Dick and Clarel to allow multiple voices
to express conflicting truths. Dialogue and dialogism are key formal terms Bakhtin defines and
describes. Dialogue is used as both literal dialogues between characters, and as manifestations of
dialogism. Dialogism is a poetic technique wherein multiple “chronotopes,” or voices, exist in
the same space. Bakhtin writes,
Within the limits of a single work and within the total literary output of a single author
we may notice a number of different chronotopes and complex interactions among them,
specific to the given work or author; it is common moreover for one of these chronotopes
to envelope or dominate the others. (Dialogic 252)
Put simply, dialogic poetics are the literary representation of two or more voices, representing
different ideologies, engaging with one another. In more complex situations, characters can
dialogue with themselves, as will be seen in Moby-Dick, by holding two or more seemingly
contradictory worldviews at once and engaging in self-reflection. When an author uses multiple
languages or dialects at once, creating tension between literary language and spoken languages,
this is also a form dialogism, specially called “heteroglossia.” Heteroglossia often challenges
which languages or dialects are more “literary” or respected within a culture, criticizing the
hierarchical nature of languages.
Melville allows multiple characters to exist, not as mouthpieces for himself, but as

illusively individual consciousnesses. The lack of clear authority between right and wrong
characters creates ambiguity. Readers naturally wonder what a novel or poem advocates, either
morally or spiritually, but literature occasionally breaks out of moral obligation. Bakhtin calls
this phenomenon of unresolved dialogue “polyphony.” Bakhtin describes polyphony as “A
plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses” (Problems 6). While this
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sounds almost synonymous with dialogue, Bakhtin describes true polyphony as a nineteenthcentury phenomenon that differs from the “early buds of polyphony” found in Rabelais,
Cervantes, and Shakespeare (Problems 34). In those pre-nineteenth-century works, a monologic
frame provided space for multiple voices to express themselves. For example, the dialogic works
of Rabelais critique Renaissance France from a humanist point-of-view, and are therefore
historically limited to Rabelais’ humanism. A villain in Rabelais is not a free consciousness, but
rather serves the purpose as an antithesis to Rabelais’ humanism. In the nineteenth-century
polyphonic novel, the text becomes open to the point wherein one cannot extract a higher
meaning, or single moral. Villains are simply villains, not necessarily condemned or pitied by the
judgement of the author. Bakhtin explains,
in literature, as we have seen, the statement of an idea is usually thoroughly monologic.
An idea is either confirmed or repudiated. All confirmed ideas are merged in the unity of
the author's seeing and representing consciousness; the unconfirmed ideas are distributed
among the heroes, no longer as signifying ideas, but rather as socially typical or
individually characteristic manifestations of thought. The one who knows, understands,
and sees is in the first instance the author himself. (Problems 82)
Therefore, when I describe Melville’s poetics as agnostic, I do not insinuate that the poetics
advocate for an agnostic worldview. On the contrary, by describing Melville’s poetics as

agnostic, I mean that they are not didactic, but instead dialogical representations of multiple,
sometimes combatting, truths.7

7

While not discussed in this essay, it is not a coincidence that agnosticism coincides with modernization,
consisting of the global market, industrialization, capitalism, and lower-middle-class access to novels,
which, according to Bakhtin, are the historical bases of dialogism to polyphony (Dialogic 30-31).
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The first section of this thesis, centered on Moby-Dick, argues that Ishmael presents an
epistemological methodology contrary to Ahab’s certainty of God’s nature. Analyzing Ishmael’s
plurality of truths through dialogic poetics, along with his acceptance of unknowability, Ishmael
optimistically offers hope in a world without certain religious truth. The second section centering
on Clarel, on the other hand, morphs into a pessimistic view of the same agnostic-pragmatism
Ishmael encourages. In a world full of so many voices, representing so many truths, the burden
of choice creates confusion, despair, and agonizing agnosticism.
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CHAPTER II
“HERE GOES FOR A COOL, COLLECTIVE DIVE AT DEATH”
AGNOSTICISM AND PRAGMATISM IN MOBY-DICK
The first sentence of Moby-Dick is not “Call me Ishmael.” Iconic though that line is, the
first sentence is the following: “The pale Usher—threadbare in coat, heart, body, and brain; I see
him now” (6). Unlike the hearty Ishmael’s famous greeting, Melville starts the novel with a
sketch centered on a sickly assistant schoolmaster who “loved to dust his old grammars” because
it “somehow mildly reminded him of his own mortality” (6). The mood is dark and elusive but
functions as the first instance of Melville’s dialogic poetics which formally carry the novel’s
central themes forward.
Melville’s sketch calls to mind Hawthorne’s sketch “The Custom-House” which kicks off
The Scarlet Letter. Like that sketch, the “Etymology” functions as a handing-off to the reader;
getting their first taste of the novel from a second-hand, not the narrator Ishmael. What follows
are three etymologies of the word “Whale.” Richard Hackluyt, famed sixteenth-century explorer,
insists that the “h” in “Whale” ought to be emphasized in English pronunciation. But who in the

English-speaking world still pronounces “Whale” as “Wah-Hale?” Then we are given two
dictionary etymologies: Webster’s dictionary suggests that “Whale” is “named from roundness
or rolling; for in Dan. hvalt is arched or vaulted” while Richardson’s dictionary suggests
conversely that “It is more immediately from the Dut. And Ger. Wallen; A.S. Walw-ian, to roll,
to wallow.” The central epistemological problem of the novel is already on display. Are
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Richardson and Webster equally correct? Or is one privileged over the other? There is no textual
indication in the sketch. Instead, the reader is left without certainty. The dictionary definitions
are thus in dialogue with one another, and neither is given pre-eminence.
Melville explores the arbitrary binary between over-certain monomaniacs and care-free
desperados, later described in 1906 by American philosopher William James in his work
Pragmatism. James writes that there are generally two types of people: the “tender-minded” and
the “tough-minded.” The tender-minded are defined as “usually…more religious” and “in favor
of what is called free will” (50). They are also “Idealistic” or “Optimistic” (50). Those who
ascribe the nature of the universe to a monistic force of some kind, whether that be Hegel’s
Absolute or a pantheistic god (55), are often indifferent to experience and facts surrounding them
concerning the suffering of the world. The other type of figure which appears in Moby-Dick is
the “tough-minded,” described by James. These individuals are “Pessimistic” “Irreligious” and
“Fatalistic” (50). Ishmael describes characters like this, most exemplified by Ahab, the
monomaniacal captain of the Pequod who spurs the crew into a hunt for the white whale. James
states that these two groups are not fixed. People ebb and flow between them and adopt certain
parts of each. James’ pragmatism attempts to break down this binary by satisfying both
personalities: “our esteem for facts has not neutralized in us all religiousness… [The Individual]
wants facts; he wants science; but he also wants a religion” (50). Moby-Dick likewise portrays

this desire to attain religious truth while escaping dogmatism, scientific or religious.
Ishmael’s methodology of truth-seeking predates William James’ description of
pragmatism: “I offer… pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of demand. It can
remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve
the richest intimacy with facts” (62). Although predating James, the methodology of Ishmael

18

reflects the same basic desire to find metaphysical truths while also staying grounded in
scientific truths. That said, Ishmael’s voice, unique as it is, does not prophesy the advent of
pragmatism. In response to the faith-doubt crisis, Melville, like James, seeks a middle-way.
Ishmael breaks free of the aforementioned binary of reason and religion through his literary
influences, like biblical language, Shakespearean dramaturgy, and essays, along with the
rhetorical ethos of skeptics who blend humor and sincerity in their theological of philosophical
writings.
While the aforementioned etymological sketch might suggest the novel is primarily
melancholic, most of the book is notably humorous. One wonders if D.H. Lawrence, one of
Moby-Dick’s first champions, only read the last five pages of the novel when he exclaims that
the center of the novel is “Doom! Doom! Doom! Something seems to whisper it in the very dark
trees of America. Doom! Doom of what? Doom of our white day. We are doomed, doomed. And
the doom is in America” (146). While capturing the themes of colonization and cultural
destruction, Lawrence neglects that much of the novel contains jocular essays and humorous, yet
earnest, celebrations of cultural difference. Hilton Obenzinger writes that, “extending through all
of the digressions… [a]ny serious or somber meditation is qualified or questioned or undermined
by humor” (“Wicked Books” 187). The coexistence of comedic writing beside meditations on
epistemology is partially indebted to Ishmael’s poetic heteroglossia. Ishmael, utilizing humor,

skepticism, and the genre of Renaissance essays, presents a cheerful display of the benefits of
agnosticism amidst an increasingly scientific, secular, and global world.
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The Formal Function of Ishmael’s Humor
Ishmael presents himself as a neurotic and well-read individual, yet he is surrounded by
sailors drastically different from himself, culturally and linguistically. The highlight of
differences in language is one of Bakhtin’s arguments for how novels rebel against the hierarchy
of “epic” works by portraying the working class on the same level as the aristocratic classes.
Bakhtin writes that in aristocratic literature, “making fun of the linguistic and speech manners of
groups living in different districts and cities throughout the nation, is something that belongs to
every people's most ancient [literature]” (Dialogic 82). However, with the advent of the modern
novel, read by lower classes and women, the process is reversed. After Rabelais, the “parodying
images of dialects began to receive more profound artistic formulation, and began to penetrate
major literature” (82). Ishmael uses linguistic parody to make fun of himself, while humanizing
those who do not share his “literariness.”
An early dialogue between Ishmael and the inn-keeper, Peter Coffin, humorously
highlights the function of dialogic poetics. Ishmael, afraid of sleeping in the same bed as “a
madman,” later revealed to be the south-sea islander Queequeg, confronts the landlord with a
long defense against sleeping with a harpooner. He ends his speech to Peter Coffin dramatically:

“and you, sir, you I mean, landlord, you, sir, by trying to induce me to do so knowingly, would
thereby render yourself liable to a criminal prosecution” (29). His repetitious, neurotic, and
judicial language contrasts with Peter Coffin’s wearisome reply “‘Wall…. That’s a purty long
sarmon for a chap that rips a little now and then…’” and he defends the harpooner Queequeq by
simply saying “He pays reg’lar” (29). Queequeg peddling heads and worshipping an idol are new
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and frightening experiences for Ishmael. The confrontation between status-quo and foreign
dialects and cultures force Ishmael to make a choice: either learn to love those who lack the
social refinement and education he possesses or give-up his desire to sail. These early sections of
the novel function as a humorous bildungsroman, showing Ishmael’s shift from close-minded
fear of the other, towards embracing cultural difference. The opening also functions as an
explanation for Ishmael’s ecumenical humanism; as the novel progresses, Ishmael becomes less
of a character, and simply narrates with a voice of charity.
The dialogic difference between cultures and languages produces both intellectual growth
and religious tolerance in Ishmael. Initially afraid of Queequeq, Ishmael learns to love him
through internal dialogic reasoning. Ishmael, who sardonically describes himself as “born and
bred in the bosom of the infallible Presbyterian church” (52), defends the idolatrous worship of
Queequeg’s idol Yojo through Christ’s commandment “to do to my fellow man what I would
have my fellow man do to me—that is the will of God” (53). And then, after helping Queequeg
worship, “in our hearts’ honey-moon, lay I and Queequeg—a cosy, loving pair” (53). Despite
linguistic and cultural gaps between Ishmael and Queequeg, Ishmael is able to grow closer to this
“cannibal” through ironic blaspheming against religious orthodoxy. Ishmael plays with a biblical
text, making the greatest commandment an ironic, but nonetheless pragmatic, defense of loving
others.

Ishmael presents himself as changing from a land-faring intellectual into a sea-faring
adventurer. This change is reflected, textually, by genre shifts. Before boarding the Pequod, the
genre is primarily an adventure narrative, much like Melville’s previous four books. However,
once on board the Pequod, the genres expand. Unlike Mardi’s attempt to subtly move from an
adventure novel to an allegorical tale, Moby-Dick changes of genre call attention to themselves. I
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refer to many of Ishmael’s chapters as “essays” because they most clearly, as will be shown,
echo the non-fiction English writings Melville knew. Ishmael’s essays, like the erudite
polymaths he invokes, often shifts the style of the essays. Some are more investigative, while
others are scientific. Almost all, however, subvert or add humor to otherwise serious genres of
writing, such as the scientific treatise (“Cetology”) or empirical philosophy (“The Fountain”).
Ishmael uses biblical texts specifically subverts orthodoxy throughout Moby-Dick.8 This
technique allows dialogic poetics to present, without overt blasphemy, literal interpretations of
the Bible. Melville, attracted to the biblical wisdom books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs,
Ecclesiastes, and Song of Solomon, makes use of their themes and poetic forms. Like the
exploitation of the golden rule to worship an idol noted above, Ishmael revels in jokes derived
from literal readings of the Bible to create ironic critiques of religious presuppositions. A fan of
oxymoronic descriptions, Ishmael compares ships joyfully chasing whales unto their violent
deaths to “pious Solomon devoutly worshipping among his thousand concubines” (293).
Jocularly highlighting that Solomon’s archetypal wisdom is undermined by his sexual excesses
(1 Kings 11), Ishmael uses these literal biblical images to create humorous unease among those
with complacent or assumed theological beliefs.
The relationship between the Bible and Moby-Dick is well noted in scholarship. For
instance, Stephen J. Bennett’s article “A Wisdom That is Woe” focuses on the influence of

Ecclesiastes on Moby-Dick. Stylistically, both Ecclesiastes and Moby-Dick have baffled critics
because of their inability to be “correctly” interpreted. Both books are “hidden mysteries that
remain unsolved” (Bennett 57). Bennet notes Ishmael’s insistence that true joys are found in
simple pleasures, derived from the later analyzed chapter “A Squeeze of the Hand,” echoes
For a brief but informative overview of Melville’s (often humorous) annotations of the Bible, see Brian
Yothers’ Sacred Uncertainty pages 21-47.
8
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Ecclesiastes’ preaching to “Live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest all the days of the life
of thy vanity, which he hath given thee under the sun” (KJV, Eccl. 9:9). Scholars like Bennett,
therefore, attempt to demonstrate biblical precedents for Ishmael’s unorthodox ideas.
In addition to these helpful readings of biblical themes in Moby-Dick, I add that
Ishmael’s technique of using biblical images and language for the purposes of critique belongs to
a long history of carnivalized biblical literature.9 The conscious influence of Rabelais and
Thomas Browne on Ishmael’s essayistic voice makes it clear that the function of Ishmael’s
parody is more in line with medieval and renaissance parody;10 historically, Bakhtin
demonstrates that “the role of parody was extremely important: it paved the way for a new
literary and linguistic consciousness [i.e. the novel]” (Dialogic 71). Bakhtin further describes
medieval and renaissance parody as “ritual degrading and the ridiculing of higher powers,”
whereas the “functions of parody [in the nineteenth-century] are narrow and unproductive”
means to simply make fun of others (71). Authors of biblical parody, including the astonishingly
bawdy Rabelais, identified as Christians, and offered critiques rather than complete dismissals of
religion. Similarly, Ishmael uses his status as “a good Christian; born and bred in the bosom of
the infallible Presbyterian Church” to parody religion with the purpose of improving it.

9

Bakhtin argues biblical parody, first seen in the early middle ages, is one of the first emanations of
dialogic poetics. In works such as Cyprian Feast (composed around 400 AD) which consists of biblical
quotations and images, “all the personages of sacred history from Adam and Eve to Christ and his
Apostles eat, drink and make merry. In this work a correspondence of all details to Sacred Writ is strictly
and precisely observed, but at the same time the entire Sacred Writ is transformed into carnival, or more
correctly into Saturnalia” (Dialogic 70).

10

Sealts chronicle shows that before writing Moby-Dick, Melville read the essays of Montaigne (199),
Rabelais novels (207), and Browne s Religio Medici (159). Melville reverentially referred to Browne as a
kind of crack d Archangel” (39).
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Renaissance Skepticism
Prior to writing Moby-Dick, Melville read Religio Medici by Thomas Browne. Browne, a
seventeenth-century essayist whose interests spanned religious discourse, hermetic philosophy,
and alchemy, influenced Melville’s prose-style and Ishmael’s voice (Parker 505). Ishmael, along
with other renaissance skeptics such as Montaigne, emulates Browne’s style. While they share
many stylistic and rhetorical strategies, Ishmael carefully infuses personal experience and
narrative into theory, whereas Browne sticks to intellectual discussions.
There is a sense of intellectual adventurousness in Ishmael’s narration, making the
Pequod an excellent space to explore new, potentially dangerous, ideas. “I love to sail forbidden
seas,” Ishmael says in the opening chapter, “Not ignoring what is good, I am quick to perceive a
horror, and could still be social with it” (20). This follows Browne’s adventurous intellectualism:
“I am, I confesse, naturally inclined to that, which misguided zeale termes superstition,”
claiming that “my behaviour full of rigor, sometimes not without morosity… yet at my devotion
I love to use… all those outward and sensible motions, which may expresse, or promote my
invisible devotion” (63). Ishmael acknowledges his lack of scholastic knowledge, “What am I
that I should essay to hook the nose of this leviathan?” He tries regardless: “I am in earnest; and I

will try” (110). Browne’s approach is similar: “In Philosophy where truth seems double-faced,
there is no man more paradoxical than my selfe” (66). Both Ishmael and Browne, without certain
knowledge about a subject, use ancient authorities, reason and intuition to seek truth.
However, the ultimate measure of truth, though similar, differs between Ishmael and
Browne. When Ishmael, scientifically incorrect, concludes that “the whale is a fish, and call upon
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holy Jonah to back me” (111), he is parodying the purpose of scientific analysis. He adopts a
view because it is simple or comforting. He also pushes the reader to consider truths they hold
without knowing why.11 The implicit question arising from Ishmael’s truth is pragmatic: What is
the benefit of believing something scientifically true if it doesn’t bring existential comfort? In a
similar fashion, Browne argues that all humans “have their Tutelary, and Guardian Angels” even
though this belief is “not manifestly defined in Scripture, yet it is an opinion of a good and
wholesome use in the course of actions of a mans life, and would serve as an hypothesis to salve
many doubts” (101). Browne’s belief in guardian angels is not derived from orthodox
hermeneutics, yet it brings comfort. Ishmael, following Browne’s example, anticipates pragmatic
methodology. Similar to William James’ central tenet of pragmatism, “If no practical difference
whatever can be traced, the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle”
(Pragmatism 26), whether a whale is a fish or a mammal doesn’t actually effect most
individuals. Where they differ is in action. Ishmael’s sometimes gives personal experience as the
reasons for believing something, such as in “The Fountain,” a chapter analyzed later in detail,
where Ishmael argues that whale spouts emit mist because he’s seen steam arise from his head
when thinking hard (280). Browne relies not on experience, but often reminds the reader that his
ideas come solely from “reason.” Reason as the measure of truth doesn’t prevent Browne from
presenting unorthodox ideas, but they also limit him. Ishmael dares to record Moby-Dick’s rising

from the water and gives great detail to a creature until that moment lurking beneath the story,
whereas Browne, writing about God’s hiddenness argues that “to pry into the maze of his
Counsels, is not onely folly in Man, but presumption even in Angels” (75). Ishmael goes beyond
Browne’s limitations by recording the experiences of confronting the seemingly impossible.

11

A primary purpose of literary parody, according to Bakhtin, analyzed later in this section.
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Formally, Ishmael emulates Browne’s prose. The form is rebellious by eschewing
rational and strictly logical ruminations. Ishmael infuses whimsical puns, oxymorons, and
alliteration throughout his narration. Scholar Brian Foley notes that Browne’s style features
“recurrent alliteration and frequent parallelism. In particular… uniting sound and sense to create
an effect normally achieved only in poetry” (269).12 Ishmael mimics the motion of the seas and
the whale’s spout when he writes, “the waves rolled by like scrolls of silver; and, by their soft,
suffusing seethings, made what seemed a silvery silence, not a solitude: on such a silent night a
silvery jet was seen far in advance of the white bubbles at the bow” (183). When read out loud,
the cadence, meter, rhythm, alliteration, and internal rhymes coalesce into a vivid poetic image.
Browne, reacting against seventeenth-century academic writing, also opts for poetic meditations.
The style and function of Ishmael’s parodic essays are critiques of hierarchical, scientific,
and literary language. Other scholars note this trend of critique, but attribute it to textually
suspicious historical or sociological causes. Dawn Coleman suggests that “Romantic irony marks
Ishmael’s sermons both in their fascination with the frightening, uncontrollable realities lurking
behind everyday appearances…and in their meditative, exploratory tone and provisional
conclusions” (137). Note that Coleman calls Ishmael’s digressive chapter “sermons.” While the
descriptions Coleman uses, “uncontrollable realities…meditative, exploratory…provisional
conclusions,” all describe elements of Ishmael’s digressions, they are not sermonic. To view

Ishmael’s essays as sermonic creates the false impression that Ishmael is attempting to teach the
reader some grand spiritual lesson or, as Coleman writes, Ishmael, “turn[s] the reading process
itself into something like a religious ritual” (140). Formally Coleman gives no examples of what
this ritual looks like.

12

For more detail on the poetic similarities, see Foley’s article, particularly pages 268-271.
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Ishmael blends blasphemous humor and somber observations of both the natural world
and spiritual phenomena to give his essays an atmosphere of jocular seriousness. Coleman
seemingly agrees, “Terror haunts [Ishmael’s] preaching, as when he exhorts readers not to look
too long into the artificial fire…or cautions them against pushing off from the inner island of
‘peace and joy’ into the ‘horrors of the half known life’” (137). However, the language here is
explicitly not echoing Protestant theology, but Platonic philosophy. Ishmael is arguing, tonguein-cheek, that it is wise to live the “unexamined life” that Socrates argues is not worth living. In
other words, ignorance is bliss; but given Ishmael’s continual intellectual searching, and the joy
he finds through his musings,13 this isn’t a serious statement. Coleman does admit that
“[Ishmael’s] sermons are exploratory, playfully ruminating over ideas then concluding with
heterodox counsel” (137). This is true, not because he emulates sermons, but rather the influence
of renaissance non-fiction writing. Part of Browne’s rhetorical strategy is highlighting, over and
over again, that he is not giving a sermon or writing theology, but presenting own thoughts,
allowing for humorous non-instructive ideas that are nonetheless entertaining and enlightening.
“I am of that reformed new-cast Religion, wherein I dislike nothing but the name” (61), Browne
writes humorously, something a sermon could not do. Reducing Ishmael’s multifarious essays as
“sermons” denies them the complexity, and constant shifting of styles which they present
throughout the novel. Were it more relevant, I would suggest that Coleman’s evaluations are

remarkably helpful for the actual sermon in Moby-Dick. Father Mapple’s sermon contains both
humor and melancholy, along with genre-mixing (Biblical exegesis, sailor-songs, hymns) and

The later section on “Ironic Springs of Wisdom” explicitly addresses how the essays are the stepping
stones to actually living out a fulfilling life.
13
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subversive critiques of religion. Melville’s most profound critique of religious sermons is found,
directly, in the genre of religious sermon.
Ishmael’s mix of conversational language (his aforementioned conversation with Peter
Coffin, for instance) with Shakespearean or biblical language (Ahab’s monologues),
demonstrate, rather than sermons that are ironically non-sermonic, heteroglossic essays; this too
stems from Browne. Samuel Johnson writes of Browne that “His style is, indeed, a tissue of
many languages; a mixture of heterogeneous words, brought together from distant regions, with
terms originally appropriated to one art, and drawn by violence into the service of another”
(508). This fusion of traditionally high and low languages creates a “lifelike concreteness” and a
“naturalistic quality” to Moby-Dick (Dialogic 365). The realism produced by uncertain voices
allows everyday figures, like Ishmael, to rebel against orthodox cultural norms, but he also
infuses sailors, like Ahab, with Shakespearean literariness. When colloquial and “epic’ language
combine “[w]hat inevitably happens is a decay and collapse of the religious, political, and
ideological authority connected with that [orthodox] language” and during this process the
“language consciousness of prose art ripens, finding its support in the social heteroglossia of
national languages that are actually spoken” (Dialogic 370). Ishmael’s parody destroys the
exclusivity of old-beliefs, paving the way for inclusivity. Similar to Browne’s humanistic
declaration that “I could never divide my selfe from any man upon the difference of an opinion”

since “I have no genius to disputes in Religion” (65), Ishmael learns to love other cultures by
abandoning the hierarchy of religious language and beliefs; “[Queequeg] has just as much reason
to fear me, as I have to be afraid of him. Better sleep with a sober cannibal than a drunken
Christian” (33). The dialogic provides a frame for ethical tolerance. Ishmael’s use of
dramaturgical devices further unifies humanity through linguistic difference.
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While Browne and Ishmael clearly echo one another, their essays differ in their logical
reasoning. Browne wrote to defend himself from the charge of atheism (Browne 61). The
insertion of heterodox views are defended by his pleading ignorance in cases where others might
think him wrong to hold such beliefs. Browne never gives the reader what Ishmael later gives in
plenty: concrete examples of how essayistic musings effect everyday ethics and experience.

The Function of Dramaturgy
Explicitly using the dramatic format, Ishmael compares and contrasts the crew’s attitudes
towards the perils of whaling and chasing the monstrous Moby-Dick. Considering the four
chapters which follow one after the other: “Sunset,” “Dusk,” “First Night-Watch,” and
“Midnight, Forecastle” we see a miniature play, influenced by Shakespeare, using iambic
pentameter, stage directions, and inserted poetry. At this point Ishmael becomes less of a
character, seldom appearing in scenes and leaving himself out of the plot, instead proclaiming
that he is the dramatist of the novel: “Oh, Ahab! What shall be grand in thee, it must needs be
plucked at from the skies, and dived for in the deep, and featured in the unbodied air!” (120).
The four chapters which follow each other show that individuals adopt truths based their place in
the social hierarchy, their surroundings, and personal experience. These inherited beliefs are not

necessarily the most comforting, but they are true for those who hold them.
First is “Sunset,” a chapter which consists solely of a monologue spoken by Ahab.
Introduced by a stage direction in italics, “The cabin; by the stern windows; Ahab sitting alone,
and gazing out,” (135) there is an immediate connection to Shakespeare. Like the potentially
mad, self-loathing, and manic-depressive Lear or Hamlet, Ahab mourns that “all loveliness is
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anguish to me, since I can ne’er enjoy. Gifted with the highest perception, I lack the low,
enjoying power” (136). Because he believes that Moby-Dick is the representation of all ills, and
that the only way to conquer this all-powerful being is to kill it, Ahab is unable to enjoy life until
it is dead. His “higher perception” and his firm belief in the duty to kill Moby-Dick makes him
realize how he looks to those around him: “They think me mad—Starbuck does; but I’m
demoniac, I am madness maddened!” (136). Ahab fully embraces his insanity and unshakable
understanding of divinity, accepting that he must confront the whale. Ahab’s belief that killing
Moby-Dick is a “fixed purpose…laid with iron rails, whereon my soul is grooved to run” (136),
is ironic, as other chapters show. It is completely within his power to turn away and not hunt the
whale, but his fundamental belief in the demiurgical God behind the pasteboard mask prevents
him from using free-will to end his hunt. Ahab’s language is ironically Calvinistic: he believes
there is a divine plan predestining him to rebel against God; his conviction, rooted in his inability
to accept uncertainty concerning the existence of evil prevents him from choosing a pragmatic
belief that could lead to a happier life.
The next chapter is also a monologue, this time spoken by Starbuck, the first mate.
Similarly beginning with an italicized stage-direction, Starbuck is alone, in terror of Ahab.
Starbuck is a passive bystander to tragedy, keen but unable or unwilling, like Hamlet’s Polonius,
to do anything about Ahab’s certain “impious end” (137). Struggling with the fact that Ahab is

his superior and therefore cannot, according to biblical ethics, rebel against him, Starbuck prays
they never find the whale. The stage direction “A burst of revelry from the forecastle” interrupts
Starbuck’s musing. He then turns his anguish to the crew: “to sail with such a heathen crew that
have small touch of human mothers in them! Whelped somewhere by the sharkish sea. … the
infernal orgies! that revelry is forward!” (137). Starbuck is critical of the crew’s ability to enjoy
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themselves while Ahab forces the hunt on them. Starbuck warns Ahab that “To be enraged with
a dumb thing, Captain Ahab, seems blasphemous” (133). Starbuck uses common sense and
theology to justify, rightly, the stupidity of Ahab’s quest. Yet Starbuck himself is immobilized
by Calvinist orthodoxy, preventing him from stopping Ahab. Starbuck’s belief in providence,
like Ahab’s, prevents him from willing a pragmatic belief. Resigning from taking action against
Ahab, he calls on God, “Stand by me, hold me, bind me, O ye blessed influences” (137).
Starbuck’s downfall is twofold: an inability to take proper action against Ahab’s evil because of
an overt trust in providence, and an inability to enjoy life, represented by the crew’s revelry he
disdains, fearing transgression against orthodox morality.
The third chapter in the play, “First Night-Watch” features a monologuing Stubb, who in
contrast to Ahab and Starbuck, is not wrapped up in dread. Rather, he is laughing, “Why so?
Because a laugh’s the wisest, easiest answer to all that’s queer” (137). Stubb stands unafraid of
the white whale. While Stubb’s cheerful-nihilism helps him cope with the reality of death, Stubb
represents William James’ description of the subjective-pragmatist, someone who “take[s] a
moral holiday… let[s] the world wag in its own way, feeling that its issues are in better hands
than ours and are none of our business (Pragmatism 82). Stubb’s beliefs benefit nobody but
himself; they neither prevent tyranny nor provide comfort to others. Stubb is the premier
example of someone who greedily hordes truth and laughs at the world’s misery. In contrast to

Ishmael’s embrace of the other, Stubb is selfish and mocking, demonstrated during his later
interaction with the cook, one of the few black men on the boat. Stubb persists in teasing and
making fun of the cook’s “simple Christianity” while waiting for him to cook parts of a whale
(228). This teasing first embarrasses the cook, but then, through understandable hatred, becomes
a desire for Stubb to get eaten by a whale: “whale eat him, ‘stead of him eat whale. I’m bressed if
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he ain’t more of a shark dan Massa Shark hisself” (230). Stubb’s nihilism breeds selfishness and
hatred between the crew. He’s also indifferent towards tyranny; after Stubb’s dream of a
pyramid-shaped Ahab kicking his behind, Stubb concludes “the best thing you can do… is to let
that old man alone” (108). Stubb’s indifference harms others with its lack of moral
responsibility.
The fourth chapter of this mini-play is titled “Midnight, Forecastle.” Instead of
monologues, the reader confronts an active, comic dialogue between the crew. The use of
lighthearted stage-directions (describing characters as “lounging, leaning, and lying” and “sulky
and sleepy”) and inserted songs, indicate Shakespearean comedy rather than tragedy, a space
inhabited by battles of wit. Instead of Stubb’s solipsism, the crew bonds through conversation
and laughter, finding comfort amidst fear. The Bakhtinian concept of literary carnival is
applicable to this chapter. Indeed, viewing it in light of carnival elucidates how a display of the
crew separated from authority presents them as ritualistically inverting the status quo by
celebrating cultural difference and mocking authority figures.
The microcosm of the Pequod is on full display in this chapter: sailors from Nantucket,
New York, Denmark, France, Iceland, Malta, Sicily, Portugal, China, India, Tahiti, Spain,
England, and Ireland all join together in a hearty and jovial dialogue. Aside from their
multiculturalism, the crew bonds over songs, drink, and shared yearning for sexual experiences.

There are no metaphysical qualms or epistemological anxieties. Rather, Ishmael invites the
reader to a scene of comic dialogues. For instance, they’re hesitant to dance because of the lack
of women. The sailor from Malta, in response to the rough waves, yells, “Now would all the
waves were women, then I’d go drown” which causes a Tahitian sailor to respond, “Hail, holy
nakedness of our dancing girls!” (141). Despite the lack of girls the crew dance together. The
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crew’s revelry, annoying to Starbuck and ignored by Stubb, creates a homosocial haven from
Ahab’s agonizing theology.
Non-white characters mock the absurdity of white people’s behaviors, another instance of
cultural inversion. Tashtego, a Native American, looking at the dancing crew smokes quietly and
says, “that’s a white man; he calls that fun: humph! I save my sweat” (140). And Pip, the black
boy from Alabama, confused by the crew’s revelry and absurd behavior, notes that “there they
go, all cursing, and here I don’t. Fine prospect to ‘em; they’re on the road to heaven” he then
pleads to the “big white God aloft there somewhere in yon darkness, have mercy on this small
black boy down here; preserve him from all men that have no bowels to feel fear!” (143-44).
Instead of whites remarking that their non-white companions are strange, the non-white
characters remark that the whites act absurd. This carnivalized inversion offers a window into the
camaraderie that Ishmael praises as a key tenet to ethics despite the lack of epistemological
certainty.14
These four chapters in conjunction with one another demonstrate Melville’s dialogic
poetics. The reader moves from Ahab’s pessimistic fundamentalism, to Starbuck’s paralyzed
Calvinism, to Stubb’s cheerful indifference, and finally to the crew’s genuine happiness despite
the ubiquity of death. Like how Bakhtin notes that “dramatic juxtaposition” (Problems 28)
allows the reader to gain insight into the motivations and reasoning behind different characters’

beliefs, these chapters demonstrate how the whole crew copes with the reality of death while

14

Scholar Bainard Cowan also interprets this scene as an instance of carnival. The revelry of the crew
disrupts Ahab s rule of magnetism and awe [which] pervades every psychic inch wherein one might hope
to find refuge from nature” (117-118). Although Cowan suggests that the carnivalized attitude of the crew
are negated by the end of the novel because an invisible, unmanifested god prevails in the last page”
(176), it s apparent that Ishmael portrays the carnivalesque positively as the equal voices of the crew
interact with one another freely, finding joy in the face of impending doom.
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whaling. By giving the crew’s revelry the final word, Ishmael prepares the reader for his own
approach to truth that does not rest in rational certainty or nihilism, but an agnostic pragmatism
that benefits both the self and others.
The purpose of these dialogic poetics isn’t to suggest that one worldview is truer than
another. Although the four chapters demonstrate Ahab and Starbuck’s blind adherence to
certainty, they are not represented as necessarily wrong (there is an evil whale lurking the seas),
they merely suffer more for their approach to truth. Stubb’s monologue is remarkably unserious
while the dialogues of the multicultural crew show joviality. Bainard Cowan writes, “Rabelais
does not advocate laughter as a wise corrective to harsh truths” (137) and neither does Ishmael,
carnivalized laughter serves a purpose. The essays in Moby-Dick are not philosophical
guidebooks. Instead, the essays are entertaining models for truth-seeking that neither dismiss the
unavoidable seriousness of life, nor obsesses over evil. Like the dictionary definitions in the
“Etymology” sketch, Ishmael’s essays present different but equally potential truths.

Ironic Springs of Wisdom: Homoeroticism and Mock-Spirituality
One might wonder, however, where Ishmael is getting these new methodologies of truth
if they prefigure the schools of agnosticism and pragmatism. “Whence then cometh wisdom? and

where is the place of understanding?” the interlude of Job asks. Ishmael, who’s “whale-ship was
my Yale College and my Harvard,” (95) finds true wisdom, not in through the hierarchically
educated individual’s prized “reason,” like Montaigne or Browne, but in the mundane activities
of work. The chapter, “A Squeeze of the Hand,” bluntly shows that work and camaraderie offer
both homosocial bonding and paths towards pragmatic truth.
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Like other chapters, Ishmael begins with an everyday working activity, in this case the
action of squeezing whale oil to soften it before boiling it down, before transitioning to
metaphysical speculation. While squeezing sperm with his shipmates, Ishmael enjoys the work to
the point of an out-of-body-experience. In ecstasy, Ishmael reports that “I forgot all about our
horrible oath; in that inexpressible sperm, I washed my hands and my heart of it… I felt divinely
free from all ill-will, or petulence, or malice, of any sort whatsoever” (309). Proceeding to
“Squeeze! squeeze! squeeze!” Ishmael then finds himself “unwittingly squeezing my colaborers’ hands in it, mistaking their hands for the gentle globules.” There is also a homoerotic
revelation: “Such an abounding… loving feeling did this avocation beget; that at last I was
continually squeezing their hands, and looking into their eyes sentimentally; as much as to say,—
Oh! My dear fellow beings, why should we longer cherish any social acerbities, or know the
slightest ill-humor or envy!” A working activity becomes a sexual activity, which results in an
ecstatic mock-religious vision wherein Ishmael reaches enlightenment: “I have perceived that in
all cases man must eventually lower, or at least shift, his conceit of attainable felicity; not placing
it anywhere in the intellect or the fancy; but in the wife, the heart, the bed, the table, the saddle,
the fire-side, the country” and finally, echoing the revery of the prophet Ezekiel: “In thoughts of
visions of the night, I saw long rows of angels in paradise, each with his hands in a jar of
spermaceti” (309). Like Queequeq and Ishmael’s mock-marriage, this prophetic announcement is

humorous yet sincerely advocates a new, unorthodox, truth.
The pleasures which Ishmael invokes, “the wife, the heart, the bed… [etc.]” (309) are the
very things that spur Ahab’s melancholy when he considers giving up the chase. Remembrance
of family spurs Ahab into melancholy reflection, “that young first-wife I wedded past fifty, and
sailed for Cape Horn the next day, leaving but one dent in my marriage pillow—wife? wife?—
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rather a widow with her husband alive!” (389). Starbuck jumps at the opportunity to persuade
Ahab to return, “why should any one give chase to that hated fish! Away with me! … let us
home! Wife and child, too, are Starbuck’s…” (389). Despite Starbuck’s pleading, “Ahab’s
glance was averted” (390) and he determines to keep hunting Moby-Dick, doomed to die either
way. Whereas Ishmael meditations, rooted in mundane, earthly experience, offer an escape from
overtly-metaphysical speculation, Ahab and Starbuck’s obsession with the divine, both negative
and positive, paralyze them from saving themselves, and others, from peril.
The joys Ishmael invokes are epicurean. They are also pragmatically not rooted in
abstract intellectual ideas, but rather attainable physical pleasures. Praising pleasure over
needless pain contrasts with Starbuck and Ahab, who suffer because of their acceptances of fate.
Coleman’s argument that “consistently, Ishmael’s sermons draw on stoicism…established back
in ‘Loomings’ when Ishmael assures us that making the transition from schoolmaster to sailor
‘requires a strong decoction of Seneca and the Stoics to enable you to grin and bear it’ (139).
Coleman fails to see this is a persistent joke in Moby-Dick: stoicism, although emphasizing
rationality, is actually an irrational outlook. I’m surprised that Coleman doesn’t see stoicism as
an avenue to critique the stereotype of Calvinistic-endurance without explicitly referring to
Calvinism. Instead, “in assigning Ishmael stoic sermons, Melville may have found inspiration in
Seneca’s maxims praising the value of sound advice” (139).15 Yet, in the first paragraph of the

The other examples of “stoicism” in Ishmael’s essays, Coleman acknowledges sound like Platonism
(two systems of thought so vastly different its odd they conflate them). It is worth pointing out the other
example, with no Platonic qualifier, they refer to: “The exhortation to equanimity at the end of 'The
Blanket” is classic Senecan teaching, as in, A good man is happy within himself, and independent upon
fortune” (139).
15
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first chapter, Ishmael humorously states that “With a philosophical flourish Cato throws himself
upon his sword; I quietly take to the ship” (16).16 Ishmael’s cure for the drizzly November of his
soul, depression, is not passive endurance, it is action. Specifically, he finds whatever naturally
brings him the simplest pleasure, costs no money, and takes the least dramatic path: “I go to sea a
simple sailor” (18). Ishmael’s simple joys of life are only interrupted by a monomaniacal and
inverted Calvinist; likewise Starbuck, the one person who could stop this monomaniacal maniac,
can’t because he accepts fate and the hierarchy of authority. To argue Ishmael supports a stoic
attitude undermines Ishmael’s jovial depictions of joy found through non-intellectual activities:
communal bonding through work and dialogue. Placing Melville within a strict historical schema
with arbitrary confines on literature’s potentiality for expression creates confusion and limited
readings. Though Ishmael’s serious meditations are indeed strikingly serious, his comical ones
can go over readers who pigeonhole him as a non-stop Calvinist critiquing preacher.17
Ishmael’s exhortation of simple joys echoes the epistemological problem that James
attempts to fix. Rationalistic, philosophical musings are “a classic sanctuary in which the
Coleman does not quote the passage and therefore twists Ishmael’s jokes into serious statements. Again,
Ishmael immediately undermines his serious statements. After some short paradoxical maxims, like
“remain warm among ice” and “be cool at the equator.” Ishmael then says, “how easy and how hopeless
to teach these fine things! Of erections, how few are domed like St. Peter’s! How few vast as the whale”
(236). Aside from the bawdy pun on how large “erections” are both rare and subject to change quickly,
like how human humors, or passions, quickly change from heat to cold, it also reinforces that humans,
which aren’t whales, cannot be stoic. A more direct influence is Shakespeare, who also bawdily compares
the quick metamorphoses of human passions to sexual intercourse: “Th’expense of spirit in a waste of
shame / Is lust in action; / and till action, lust is perjured… Enjoyed no sooner but depsisèd straight”
(“129” 1-3, 5). He also reinforces that humans can’t escape this dilemma because they are human: “All
the world well know, yet none knows well / To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell” (13-14).
Parker’s note on this passage: “The suicide of this Roman statesman-soldier…after his defeat in battle,
exemplified his Stoic philosophy. Stoicism is the belief that people should uncomplainingly accept all
events as the unavoidable results of divine will” (16).
16

17

See Lawrence Thompson’s Melville’s Quarrel With God, which makes this argument.
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rationalist fancy may take refuge from the intolerably confused and gothic character which mere
facts [i.e., reality] present” (Pragmatism 57). Too much rationalization is no more than “a
remedy, a way of escape” from the “tangled, muddy, painful, and perplexed” presence of
suffering in nature (57). Ahab assigns all earthly ills to Moby-Dick to rationalize evil; yet instead
of over-interpreting the meaning of evil, Ishmael resembles James’ pragmatism since he
“preserves as cordial a relation with facts” and simultaneously “neither begins nor ends by
turning positive religious constructions out of doors—it treats them cordially as well” (66).
Squeezing sperm is a real, material experience that leads Ishmael to genuine spiritual insight.
Because of Ishmael’s ecumenical humanism, and his ability to find revelation in actions
as mundane as squeezing sperm, some scholars label him a pantheist. For example, Brian
Yothers argues that Moby-Dick preaches pantheism by placing “human connectedness… [as] the
grounds for the moment that transcends ordinary human experience” (90). Pantheism, as
Melville understood it, suggests an optimistic theological belief that does not match the nuanced
ruminations of Ishmael.18 Nature, portrayed by Ishmael, is not wholly divine, and therefore is not
worthy of worship. Ishmael’s approach to pantheism is nearly identical to William James’
pragmatic solution to oneness (pantheism). James writes, “[pragmatism] must equally abjure
absolute monism and absolute pluralism” (71). So long as there are elements of disunity or evil,
the pragmatist cannot say whether the world is monistic or pluralistic, “Some day…a universe

consolidated in every conceivable way, may turn out to be the most acceptable of all hypotheses.
Meanwhile the opposite hypothesis, of a world imperfectly unified still, and perhaps always to

Concerning Goethe’s statement that humanity must “live in the All,” Melville wrote to Hawthorne:
“What nonsense! Here is a fellow with a raging toothache. ‘My dear boy,’ Goethe says to him, ‘you are
sorely afflicted with that toothache, but you must live in the all, and then you will be happy”
(Correspondence 193 qtd. in Yothers 91). Goethe’s idealism is not practical, ignoring even the lowest
pains of humanity, and offering no remedy.
18
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remain so, must be sincerely entertained” (123). Entertained, but not necessarily true, James’
position is agnostic in the sense of Huxley’s definition. The pragmatist is waiting for “the final
empirical ascertainment of just what the balance of union and disunion among things may be”
(123). In the meantime, a pragmatist is in “the common-sense world, in which we find things
partly joined and early disjoined” (123). Similarly, Ishmael describes pantheistic oneness, such
as on the mast-head, where “by the blending cadence of waves with thoughts, that at last [one]
loses his identity; takes the mystic ocean at his feet for the visible image of that deep, blue,
bottomless soul, pervading mankind and nature” (129). However, this portrait of oneness is
disrupted: “Over Descartian vortices you hover. And perhaps, at mid-day, in the fairest weather,
with one half throttled shriek you drop through that transparent air into the summer sea, no more
to rise for ever,” and Ishmael warns, “Heed it well, ye Pantheists!” (129), warning that optimistic
pantheism ignores the reality of death. Likewise, while Ishmael feels a unity in squeezing his colaborer’s hands, still there is “universal cannibalism… all whose creatures prey upon each other,
carrying on eternal war since the world began” (215). Ishmael, aware of visible and invisible
elements of unity and disunity, cannot share Emerson’s declaration that “Nature never wears a
mean appearance. Neither does the wisest man extort her secret, and lose his curiosity by finding
out all her perfection” (9). Were Ishmael to adopt optimistic pantheism, he would turn a blind
eye to the disunity or “cannibalism” in the apparent oneness of the world.

Ishmael’s digressions are still opportunities for celebrating the natural wonders of the
world despite evil. “The Fountain,” a digressive chapter unconcerned with the plot, finds Ishmael
analyzing whale spouts. He wonders why nobody can tell with certainty “whether these
spoutings are, after all, really water, or nothing but vapor” (277). Ishmael, after describing the
whale’s spout scientifically, enters a dialogue with himself: “But why pester one with all this
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reasoning on the subject? Speak out! You have seen him spout; then declare what the spout is,
can you not tell water from air?” In response, Ishmael calmly says, “My dear sir, in this world it
is not so easy to settle these plain things. I have ever found your plain things the knottiest of all”
(279). Ishmael acknowledges that both empirical study and abstract speculation are not enough
to know a thing in itself. Perhaps Hume’s argument that “[even] stupid peasants… improve by
experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing” (Enquiry 25), will suffice.
But Ishmael rejects experience: “the spout is deemed poisonous” because the pressure from it
can peel off skin and blind you if it gets in your eyes (280). Instead, “The wisest thing the
investigator can do then, it seems to me, is to let this deadly spout alone” (280). Lacking
knowledge, Ishmael nonetheless resolves the meditation.19
Despite the inability to experience the spout, “We can hypothesize, even if we cannot
prove and establish” (280). Ishmael concludes that the spout “is nothing but mist” (280). His
reason for this is rooted in self-formed truth rather than experience or metaphysical speculation.
Because the sperm whale is “no common, shallow being” but instead “ponderous and profound,”
Ishmael concludes that, like “Plato, Pyrrho, the Devil, Jupiter, Dante, and so on, there always
goes up a certain semi-visible steam, while in the act of thinking deep thoughts” (280). The
comical vision of steam rising from the heads of controversial figures is Ishmael’s argument that
the sperm whale emits mist, not water. Ishmael, comparing himself to those aforementioned

steam-raising figures, shifts tone, “[w]hile composing a little treatise on Eternity, I had the
curiosity to place a mirror before me; and ere long saw reflected there, a curious involved
worming and undulation in the atmosphere over my head” (280). Ishmael’s isolated experience

19

While Obenzinger leaves his interpretation of the chapter at this point, writing, "The search for
knowledge is dangerous. […] The constant presence of death frames the search for meaning; we all stare
into the void, and the true seeker knows that death can arrive at any moment” (186), the progression of
the chapter reveals quite the opposite.
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doesn’t use scientific facts, nor is it blindly holding onto a common orthodox conviction, similar
to Browne.20 At the end of the chapter, Ishmael gives a credo of his beliefs:
“through all the thick mists of the dim doubts in my mind, divine intuitions now and then
shoot, enkindling my fog with a heavenly ray. And for this I thank God; for all have
doubts; many deny; but doubts or denials, few along with them, have intuitions. Doubts
of all things earthly, and intuitions of some things heavenly; this combination makes
neither believer nor infidel, but makes a man who regards both with equal eye” (280).
Ishmael lacks certainty, following only intuition. This pragmatic truth-seeking brings both
internal peace and tolerance. Ishmael’s pragmatic view of religion is a healthy alternative to
Ahab’s certainty. Moby-Dick is not Lawrence’s tragic tale of “Doom! Doom! Doom!” but rather
“Squeeze! Squeeze! Squeeze!” It cautions readers against certainty. The tension of not knowing
and desiring knowledge is positive. Ishmael’s growth into tolerance begins by turning his desires
away from the inscrutable, and towards the pleasures in front of him.

20

For example, Browne s understanding of the Trinity rests in his belief that there is in us, if not three
distinct soules, yet differing faculties…and yet in us are so united as to make but one soule and
substance” (73) Browne admits this is a personal conjecture beyond reason, and confesses that he likes his
answer because I have often admired the mysticall way of Pythagoras, and the secret Magicke of
numbers” (73).
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CHAPTER III
“THEOLOGY, ART THOU SO BLIND?”
THE AGONY OF AGNOSTICISM IN CLAREL

Melville never again reached the monetary or literary success he achieved with his
romantic travelogues such as Typee (1846). A book which one reviewer in 1858 argued “is the
best” of Melville’s works. Meanwhile, the same anonymous reviewer says The Confidence-Man
(1857) is “decidedly the worst” (“Dismally Monotonous” 290). In the remarkably short period
from 1849-1857, Melville, writing furiously, completed all the prose-fiction that appeared in his
life. Despite the impressive output, his career quickly fell out of favor due to his increasing
strangeness, experimentalism, and as critics saw it, pessimism. As George Washington Peck
writes in his review of Moby-Dick’s follow up, Pierre (1852), “A bad book! Affected in dialect,
unnatural in conception, repulsive in plot, and inartistic in construction. Such is Mr. Melville’s
latest work” (432). In 1858, an anonymous reviewer of The Confidence-Man writes that
Melville, while “the oddest, most unique” writer of the period, nevertheless appears as someone
who is “not in love or sympathy with his kind” (“A Writer” 285).

These critics, while not charitable towards the increasingly experimental themes and
styles of Melville’s later prose, were right to note the philosophical skepticism and pessimism.
The bad press, however, contributed to Melville’s failure as an author. He received “not a penny”
for The Confidence-Man (Parker 629) and after his last sea-faring adventure to the Holy Land, he
returned depressed and “never regained his former vigor or strength” (629). Moving into poetry,
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his first collection Battle Pieces (1866) was “poorly received.” His publisher “did not pay for the
war poems they printed” (630). Destitute, in 1866 Melville took a desk-job as a custom officer in
New York City, where he worked for nineteen years, composing the poem Clarel while at his
office (630).
A biographical reading yields many interesting guesses about Clarel’s reason for
existence, the potential solace it gave Melville,21 or the wisdom it might teach its readers.
However, not letting Melville’s personal crises sway the text of Clarel, we can use these
historical details to see, to some extent, why Clarel is such a strange work. Melville, not writing
for money and with no audience to please, had free reign with Clarel’s subject matter and style.
The moody, droning, eight-syllable lines of tetrameter featured in Clarel, written during a time
when Longfellow’s ballads and long poems in iambic pentameter verse were all the rage, makes
them stand out as formally fascinating choices for an epic and deeply philosophical work.

The Scholarly Conversations of Clarel
Using dialogic poetics to show how more voices in an increasingly secular society
multiply the potential truths, Clarel pessimistically suggests that no worldview or religion can
bring authentic existential comfort. Against William James argument that one can will

themselves into belief, Clarel tragically demonstrates that when the number of potential truths

The comically biased Melville’s Religious Journey argues that Clarel’s despair is nothing more than a
“working through” of difficult questions that would ultimately lead Melville to make “personal and
literary peace with the unitarian church and with God, through his own personal discoveries" (Kring 18).
The author just so happens to be a Unitarian minister at the same Unitarian church Melville’s wife
attended.
21
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rises, this task becomes near-impossible. The amount of “live-wires” poses threats of electric
shock rather than solace.
The plot of Clarel is sparse despite its 18,000 lines divided into four books. An American
theology student, Clarel, staying in a Jerusalem hostel to revive his waning faith, broods alone.
He reluctantly notes, disillusioned, “‘Other cheer / Than that anticipated here’” (I.i.19-20)
prevents his spiritual revival. Deciding to explore his surroundings, Clarel meets a Jewish girl
named Ruth, who he quickly falls in love with. However, her father Nathan, an ex-deist turned
Zionist, is killed by local Muslims. Due Jewish mourning customs, Clarel is not allowed to visit
Ruth. So, to pass the time and maybe find spiritual relief, he goes on a guided tour of the Holy
Land with a large cast of characters. The majority of the poem, books two, three, and four,
follow Clarel and other pilgrims as they discuss theological, philosophical, and historical matters
while passing famous sites, such as Sodom, Mar Saba, and the Via Crucis. Despite only lasting
ten days, three pilgrims die of bizarre, symbolic causes during the journey. When Clarel returns
to Jerusalem, he finds that Ruth, upset over Clarel leaving, died of heartbreak. Clarel, in despair
and confusion, journeys into a dark alley, and the plot of the poem ends. A brief epilogue musing
on the relationship between science and religious faith closes the poem.
Despite the tragic plot of the poem, scholars are quick to find hope between the lines of
despair.22 For instance, Yothers, while admitting the poem ends tragically and, on the surface,

unresolved, suggests that “Clarel has an almost mystical experience of the reality of religious
pluralism” and that Melville “leaves the confrontation between religious pluralism as a source of
hope” (178-179). Potter, using new historicism, relies on comparative religious studies in the

22

Since my reading of Clarel is primarily formal, I interact with book-length works centering on the
structure of the poem as a whole. Recent articles, though relatively few in number, focus more intently on
certain characters or poetic images. Such as “Calculated Dialogues: Derwent s Imaginary Conversations
in Clarel” by Dennis Berthold, which is dealt with in this chapter.
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nineteenth-century to suggest that Clarel ends with a celebration of the “Intersympathy of
creeds” wherein “by the end of the poem, Clarel has gone from suffering in solitude in the first
canto to being part of the great cosmic march of human and animal pilgrims…each bearing its
own cross” (19). In other words, the poem is a recognition of, and celebration of, the universality
of human suffering, and the need embrace this ubiquitous trait of existence. However, Potter
misreads the ending of Clarel, somehow not acknowledging that Clarel actually turns away from
the train of sufferers in defiance. The aforementioned critics often invoke Kierkegaard in their
reading of Clarel, suggesting that Clarel advocates an existential Christian faith.23 Formally,
however, the poem explicitly critiques this absurdist or existentialist approach to religion as
ultimately unsatisfying.
This chapter stresses the dialogic poetics Melville employs throughout Clarel. Other
scholars note the dialogic elements,24 but these critics abandon the function of dialogic poetics by
suggesting the poem advocates or reveals a specific worldview Melville held.25 However, the
dialogues are consistently inconclusive. Instead of advocating for a particular theological or

23

Joseph G. Knapp, an influential early scholar of the poem, suggests that Clarel advocates a religion of
endurance: The Christianity that Melville found was…a promise of the same fate that befell its founder.
… Christ s suffering and man s suffering provide not only a community of suffering but a connaturality of
knowledge” (115). Knapp s reading is absurdist, suggesting a Camus-like image of Melville s insistence
that humans continue to endure suffering despite its endless and unassuageable nature.

Yothers writes, Melville uses a dialogic poetics that explores the sacred spaces of the Holy Land…’”
(171). Goldman argues that It is more rewarding to read Clarel not as poetry, which some discourse
theorists including Bakhtin view as monological, but as a narrative verse that contains the essential
dialogic principle usually associated with prose fiction” (6). Potter writes, [Clarel] may rightfully be
considered an example of what Mikhail Bakhtin calls a novelized poem’” because it possesses two of
the three characteristics Bakhtin identified that distinguish the novel from other genres” (213).
24

The titles of works like Yothers’ Sacred Uncertainty, Potter’s Intersympathy of Creeds, and Goldman’s
Protest Theism capture the biographical arguments of these critics.
25
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philosophical position, the dialogues display the problem of coexisting truths. By focusing on the
polyphonic poetics of Clarel, no character, including the third-person narrator, represents the
author’s worldview. Bakhtin notes that the common error of associating characters with their
author “does in fact correspond to a basic structural feature of [polyphonic] works…. [they]
create not voiceless slaves… but free people, capable of standing alongside their creator, capable
of not agreeing with him and even of rebelling against him” (Problems 6). In Clarel this
polyphony is on full display: all voices are open-texts. Thus the reader, not the poem, decides
which characters are closer to truth.

Frustrating Form and Its Intent
Clarel is a frustrating poem to read not only for its thematic inconclusiveness but for its
strange vocabulary, meter, and inconsistent rhyme scheme. Mathiessen, in his work American
Renaissance, argues that “Clarel is practically unreadable because of Melville’s inexplicable
choice of rhymed tetrameter as the medium for philosophic meditation” (401). Matthiessen is
right to note the frustrating form, but there is no reason why this meter (iambic tetrameter)
cannot be used to capture philosophical dialogues.26 Stein’s critique that “What we miss in
Clarel is the jocular seriousness of Moby-Dick, where the ideas of the great thinkers were

convenient grist for the buoyant imagination” (12), reflects a yearning for the older
experimentalism of Melville. It is indeed shocking to find that the neurotic humor of Moby-Dick,
with its “jocular seriousness” is almost completely replaced by somber meditations. However,

Tennyson’s In Memoriam, one of the most serious poetic meditations on faith and doubt, is also written
in tetrameter, though in four-line elegiac stanzas following an abba rhyme pattern.
26
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these formal shifts fit the poem, as it reinforces the droning and seemingly endless and
depressing depictions of the inability to adopt religious faith.
The narrator comments on the tone and structure of the poem before the pilgrimage
begins, warning the reader about its unentertaining style. Clarel is presented as the Canterbury
Tales without the tales:
Not from brace Chaucer’s Tabard Inn
They pictured wend; scarce shall they win
Fair Kent, and Canterbury ken;
Nor Franklin, squire, nor Morris-dance
Of wit and story good as then:
Another age, and other man,
And life an unfulfilled romance. (II.i.7-13)
Instead of stories blending bawdiness, heroism, piety, and romance, there are heady theological
and philosophical discussions. The pessimism of their pilgrimage, its deaths and confounding
theological disappointments, are not simply due to the people involved, but also the time in
which Melville is capturing. The travelers of Clarel’s pilgrimage polyphonically, that is to say,
holding theologically different ideas presented as equally true, represent a spectrum of
disillusionment towards religious plurality in the nineteenth-century.

This polyphonic tension enters Clarel in the first canto. Clarel, an American theology
student, is sitting alone in his room in Jerusalem, brooding over his disappointment while visiting
the Holy Land
“Other cheer
Than that anticipated here,
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By me the learner, now I find.
Theology, art thou so blind?” (I.i.19-16)
Then he remembers something an American staying in Jerusalem told him:
‘“Our New World’s worldly wit so shrewd
Lacks the Semitic reverent mood,
Unwordly—hardly may confer
Fitness for just interpreter
Of Palestine. …
To avoid the deep saves not from storm.’” (I.i.92-96, 99)
Although this unnamed traveler gives Clarel an answer to his disappointment, that the “New
World” lacks Judaism’s reverence for the divine, Clarel cannot will himself into belief, “No clear
authenticated Lore / I deemed… Tis the uprooting of content!” (I.i.101-102, 105). In this first
canto Melville previews the form of the whole poem. Characters, not just Clarel, are
discontented, then come across others with different points of view that produce further
confusion. Unlike Ishmael, who through dialogic interaction tolerates new truths and is willing to
adopt beliefs serving a pragmatic function, in Clarel this approach is not easily attained or
perhaps impossible.

Contrasting Loomings: Ishmael and Clarel
Given their similarities, it’s odd that none of the major book length studies of Clarel
connect Clarel’s journey with Ishmael’s. Their respective journeys are parallel yet reach opposite
conclusions. Like Ishmael, Clarel begins the poem as a wanderer. He is “looming,” as the first
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chapter of Moby-Dick begins. Clarel is similarly bumbling around, melancholy and brooding.
While Ishmael assuages his melancholy by going to sea because he feels almost supernaturally
called to do so, Clarel begins to explore his surroundings because he lacks any supernatural
sensations and hears “no sound / Except low hum” (I.i.144-145) of Jerusalem’s streets. Clarel’s
journey begins, and remains, a fish-out-of-water story; not only is he different from the majority
of the population of the Holy Land, but he is also out of place among the older travelers.
Ishmael’s bildungsroman, wherein he comes to accept the cultural differences of others through
dialogic interaction, opposes Clarel’s beginning. It is not comic, and unlike Ishmael, Clarel can
never fully embrace new ideas. It is as if the journey of Ishmael, which becomes a celebration of
dialogic interactions, becomes, as Clarel notes, a time of “‘unlearning,’” because the more he
learns, the more “‘Opes the expanse of time’s vast sea’” (I.i.80-81). He accepts that bookish
knowledge does not correlate to experiential knowledge: “‘Yes, I am young, but Asia old. / The
books, the books not all have told.’” (I.i.82-83). Ishmael’s erudition, despite his lack of a college
career, allow him to will pragmatic truths despite certain knowledge. But Clarel, a theology
student drenched in study, must unlearn all he’s come to know from books, and relinquish
rationality in the hope of finding spiritual fulfillment through direct experience of divinity.
Whereas Ishmael finds new beliefs through different dialogical interactions and then
becomes a passive narrator, Clarel speaks little throughout the poem, only speaking passionately

at the end. The lack of speech indicates Clarel’s desire to passively absorb other ideas, rather
than dialectically struggle for higher truth. Like a Socratic interlocutor, he often interjects, asking
questions or expressing confusion while others argue.
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Even when Clarel wants to speak, he cannot muster words. When Celio, a hunchbacked
Italian full of doubt and despair, that Melville compares to the notably pessimistic nineteenthcentury Italian poet Giacomo Leopardi (I.xiv.3), meets Clarel, the narrator asks,

But what’s evoked in Clarel’s mien—
What look, responsive look is seen
In Celio, as together there
They pause? Can these a climax share?
Mutual in approach may glide
Minds which from poles adverse have come,
Belief or unbelief? (I.xvi.50-56)
The narrator, who notes that Celio and Clarel made long-distance eye contact before, suggests
that some sort of bond without words exists between them. The narrator’s question, “Can these a
climax share?” indicates both a desire for a sexual encounter,27 but also a climax of spiritual
revelation to assuage their respective doubts. Clarel’s uncertainty of Christianity prevents
spiritual respite. Celio’s atheistic declaration that religions are “illusive schemes,” (I.xiii.96) a
favorite metaphor of Leopardi, battles a simultaneous pull towards spirituality; Celio muses to
himself that “by these [Christian] monuments I’m schooled, / Arrested, strangely overruled”

(I.xiii.136-137). Despite the meeting between them, they do not engage in conversation. Celio,
who “turned away” (I.xvi.78) provokes the narrator’s lamentation over Clarel’s demure
personality: “Ah, student, ill thy sort have sped: / The instant proffer—it is fled!” (I.xvi.79-80).

While scholars acknowledge homoerotic elements in Clarel, I’ve yet to come across a book-length
study, or Clarel-exclusive article, with a queer-centric reading. However, the sorrow brought by
unfulfilled homoerotic bonds inverts the celebration on display in Moby-Dick, and demonstrates one of
the pessimistic outcomes of uncertainty.
27
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Unlike Ishmael’s encounter with Queequeg resulting in a loving friendship despite their
differences, Clarel cannot muster the courage, either out of shyness or anxiety, to engage with
Celio. That the narrator calls their potential meeting a “proffer” suggests that Clarel wants to
offer a proposal of some kind, whether for friendship or erotic attachment, like Ishmael and
Queequeg, is vague. It certainly suggests, however, that Clarel desires engagement in theological
speculation with a kindred spirit.
Later dialogues do not lead to spiritual certainty, only further confusion or agony.
Ironically, Clarel is saved, in a sense, from the despair of dialogue with Celio because Celio dies
before they can converse. The narrator says when Celio dies,
But have hearts forgot
That ties may form where words be not?
The spiritual sympathy
Transcends the social. (I.xix.1-4)
Their unspoken relationship is pure, untainted by metaphysical concerns or doubts, but when
Clarel discovers Celio’s journal, he finds in the pages a “heart to brave / All questions on that
primal ground / Laid bare by faith’s receding wave” (I.xix.28-30). After reading Celio’s desire
for truth despite the pull between atheism and theism, Clarel begins to anxiously turn over many
unanswerable questions:

“Is death the book’s fly-page?
Is no hereafter? If there be,
Death foots what record? How forestalls
Acquittance in eternity?
Advance too, and through age on age?” (I.xix.36-40)
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Interaction with others, in this case a dialogue with the dead, only creates more vexing questions
for Clarel. Melville inserts this episode of Celio, which carries little bearing on the poem as a
whole, to demonstrate Clarel’s failure to understand that the questions he asks possess no
answer. Clarel cannot emulate this model of Ishmael’s digressions, where the lack of knowledge,
literary authorities, and pragmatic will-to-believe become the method for truth. The optimistic
pluralism Ishmael celebrates is unsatisfactory because, contrary to James’ pragmatic theory of
“the will to believe,” willing oneself into belief without certainty is both difficult and inauthentic.

Aporetic Dialogue
In stark contrast to Ishmael’s ability to adopt a truth, no matter how absurd, intellectual
dialogues in Clarel end in confusion or agony. More precisely, Clarel is a collection of aporetic
dialogues. Melville’s appreciation for Plato is well documented,28 and Clarel, like Plato’s
aporetic, or inconclusive, dialogues, leave the primary question at hand unanswered; the reader
must work through the reasons presented for the existence an abstract idea, such as beauty or
justice, and determine which character in the dialogue is closest to the truth. In Clarel, the
ultimate question, “can religion survive in the face of scientific advances and theological
scrutiny?” is unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable.29 Nonetheless, the reader sees that,

Melville first read Plato before writing Mardi. Sealts reports that “[Thomas] Browne led him in turn to
the dialogues of Plato, which became a major influence on the form and content of [Mardi]” (39).
Melville continued reading Plato up until his final unfinished work Billy Budd (138). For more on the
formal and philosophical relationships between Plato and Melville, consult Michael Levin’s article “Ahab
as Socratic Philosopher” and Sealts’ article “Melville and the Platonic Tradition” (see works cited).
28

George Rudebusch defines aporetic dialogue as one that “begins with a question and then work[s] step
by step to an answer. But then that answer is undermined and rejected” (Rudebusch 540-41). Scholars
differ on whether or not the inconclusiveness is an ironic trait, or a genuine reflection of the impossibility
29
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although definite truth is not reached, certain characters come closer to the truth than others. Like
Socrates’ famous statement that his wisdom is found in knowing nothing, the characters in
Clarel most ready to admit their lack of knowledge are more reasonable than those who ardently
but irrationally defend their beliefs. In the end only one character, Clarel, is able to fully
acknowledge the scope of their unknowing.
The agnostic poetics of Clarel create an atmosphere restlessness. Every dialogue in the
poem designed to enlighten both the characters listening and the reader produce
unenlightenment, confusion, or despair. For instance, when Rolfe, “an unreserved man… who
possesses a sensitive heart and mind” (Hutchins 13) is introduced, he is contemplating Omar, a
Muslim who refused to disturb a Christian church but rather prayed outside in solitude.30 In the
place where Omar prayed, a minaret was erected. Rolfe uses this minaret’s symbolism to
criticize Christianity’s violence against Omar (and Muslims in general), “‘how ill conformed /
The butchery then to Omar’s prayer / And Heart magnanimous’” (I.xxxi.103-105). Amazed by
his erudition, Clarel begs him to go on, and Rolfe criticizes the Catholic Church and its tradition
of violence, starting with “‘Constantine—there falls the blight!’” (I.xxxi.115) to how it is
“‘Unquelled by force of battering years— / Years, years, and sieges, sword and flame; / Fallen—
rebuilt, to fall anew’” (I.xxxi.146-148). Though he begs Rolfe to continue his monologue, Clarel
presses Rolfe “in such a tone / It showed disturbance” (I.xxxi.132-133), suggesting that Rolfe’s

knowledge and criticism of the Church causes Clarel to worry as much as it encourages curiosity.
Rolfe argues that the Catholic Church will always exist because of its insistence to adapt to new

of knowing certain philosophical questions. Similar to Melville, Rudebusch notes that inconclusiveness
creates controversy: “There has been a persistent controversy over whether the aporetic dialogues are
meant to convey any underlying philosophical position at all” (539).
30 Although Rolfe is often considered the “hero” of the poem, given his humanism and earnest desire for
religious knowledge mixed with skepticism, a later section of this chapter demonstrates this designation,
while tempting, is textually suspect.
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philosophies and surroundings by force. Clarel questions the plausibility of the eternal existence
of the church (I.xxxi.185) but Rolfe responds that

“Yea, long as children feel affright
In darkness, men shall fear a God;
And long as daisies yield delight
Shall see His footprints in the sod.
Is’t ignorance? This ignorant state
Science doth but elucidate—
Deepen, enlarge. But though ‘twere made
Demonstrable that God is not—
What then? It would not change this lot;
The ghost would haunt, nor could be laid.” (I.xxxi.191-200)
Rolfe’s initial criticism of Catholicism turns into a meditation on the necessity of religion no
matter how advanced science becomes. The narrator notes that “Clarel ill-relished” (I.xxxi.210)
Rolfe’s speech but also notes that, like a processional of desert travelers covered in dust, “the
novice [Clarel] streamed along / Rolfe’s filing thoughts, a soldering throng” (I.xxxi.284-285).
Clarel responds with confusion, as he, a “novice,” cannot grasp Rolfe’s non-dogmatic religious

sentiments. As one scholar notes, Clarel tends to desire an either/or response to his questions,31
but more often than not, especially when interacting with Rolfe or Derwent, a naive but

31

Using the Bible as a precedent for his reading, Goldman suggests that Clarel attempts to move beyond
“‘either/or’ absolutism characteristic of the Law and the Prophets into the more flexible ‘both/and’ of the
Proverbs” (99). For more on the idea that Melville is emulating the Bible’s ethos towards desiring
answers from God that are not fixed, see Goldman’s Protest Theism, especially chapter three, “GodWrestling: The Thematics and Poetics of ‘Contraries’” pages 73-102.
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optimistic Anglican priest, the answers Clarel seeks are discussed through meanderings that
avoid the question asked. Clarel wants to know how the Catholic Church will last forever, but
Rolfe’s oblique response about the endurance of all religions doesn’t answer Clarel’s question.
Like the aforementioned digression about Celio, the canto “Prelusive,” which occurs
midway through the poem (book II, Canto xxxv) as the pilgrims come across the supposed site of
Sodom, uses a digression to warn readers about the difficulty of the poem itself. The narrator
begins:
In Piranezi’s rarer prints,
Interiors measurelessly strange,
Where the distrustful thought may range
Misgiving still—what means the hints? (II.xxxv.1-4)
Immediately the reader is assaulted with vague allusions to an artist. The prints in question, by
the eighteenth-century Italian artist Piranezi, represent fantastical prisons with labyrinthine stairs
and unsettling, dream-like architecture. These enigmatic questions are followed by the narrator’s
usual rhetorical questioning, here asking “what means the hints?” challenging the reader to
wonder why these dream-prisons provoke unease in the viewer. As usual, too, the narrator does
not answer the question, but delves deeper into investigation.
The canto, like one of Ishmael’s essays, begins with an object, brings forth a question,

and investigates the matter. Like Ishmael, the narrator will reach a conclusion, but the conclusion
neither answers the question nor encourages the reader’s beliefs. The investigation proceeds with
a brief description of these fantasy prisons, before entering into a strange, almost stream-ofconsciousness digression. From these dream-like etchings the narrator suggests that
Thy wings, Imagination, span
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Ideal truth in fable’s seat:
The thing implied is one with men,
His penetralia of retreat—
The heart, with labyrinths replete:
In freaks of imitation see
Paul’s “mystery of iniquity:”
Involved indeed, a blur of dream… (II.xxxv.18-25)
Given the combination of difficult syntax due to the requirements of the tetrameter and the
antiquated vocabulary, one gleans, at most, an impressionistic description of the unconscious;
humans form “ideal truth” from “fable’s seat” by spreading the wings of our “imagination.” Like
the labyrinthine prints of surreal prisons, our hearts are “replete” with labyrinths that prevent us
from grasping a comfortable truth from the “penetralia,” the innermost part, of our being. It is
only in “freaks of imitation” or some sort of spiritual experience that is more horrible than
benign,32 that we can understand the “mystery of iniquity,” a quotation of Paul’s description of
evil from 2 Thessalonians 2:7. The narrator then tells the reader to “Dwell on those etchings in
the night” (II.xxxv.33) and then wait until “ye feel / The Pauline text in gray of light; / Turn
hither then and read aright” (II.xxxv.35-37). The poetic qualities, though organized by tetrameter
lines, cause unease in their inconsistent rhymes and bizarre imagery.

The end of the canto explains itself against the charge of mere digression. The narrator
explains that the canto is named “Prelusive” because it warns the reader against reading the
following canto:

A similar sentiment is found preceding Ishmael’s spiritual vision of angels squeezing spermaceti. The
young black boy Pip experiences a vision of “the multitudinous, God-omnipresent, coral insects” which
leads to his madness. Ishmael warns that “Wisdom” defined by Judeo-Christian tradition, is “man’s
insanity” and “heaven’s sense” (308). Whereas his own wisdom, found in mundane activities, is safer.
32
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For ye who green or gray retain
Childhood’s illusion, or but feign;

As bride and suite let pass a bier—
So pass the coming canto here. (II.xxxv.38-41)
In other words, if the reader holds to childlike faith, or doesn’t wrack their brains around heady
theological issues, skip the next canto and avoid existential pain. Ishmael’s advocation of
multiple sources of knowledge is inverted: the more one knows, the more truths clash; deep
investigations are a dangerous enterprise. Telling the reader to stop reading the poem strikes a
modern audience as either post-modern or ironic. However, there is an earnestness in the poet to
give readers a forewarning that Clarel’s purpose is neither to encourage nor assuage doubt. Like
the description of the pilgrims profoundly serious, not like Chaucer’s pilgrims who pass the time
through charming stories, the poem charitably reminds the reader that it captures the experience
of religious uncertainty, not providing a remedy.
The canto “Prelusive” deals with doubt abstractly, but the following canto it warns
against reading turns those anxieties into concrete poetic images. The pilgrims are near the
supposed site of Sodom, and in response Mortmain gives a speech arguing that the sins of
Sodom were “not all carnal harlotry” (II.xxxvi.43). Mortmain, a pessimistic monomaniac, is “a

Swedish bastard who moved to Paris and started a successful, famous Utopian community” who
later became disenchanted “with the fools who joined,” deciding instead to adopt the role of “an
anonymous ascetic wandering the world’s wastelands in despair” (Hutchins 16). Mortmain is
obsessively misanthropic, never allowing optimistic notions to sway his despair or hatred. His
speech here gives a vivid portrait of his outlook. He argues that the inhabitants of Sodom were
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by nature evil; their only sin which provoked God’s wrath was their enjoyment of existence. He
curses God for bothering to make humanity if they are evil by nature: “Tis thou who servedst
Mammon’s hate / Or greed through forms which holy are” (II.xxxvi.74-75). The rest of the
pilgrims, like the “green” readers the narrator warned in the previous canto, “all had left him, one
by one. / Was it because he open threw / The inmost to the outward view?” (II.xxxvi.110-112).
Mortmain’s bold criticism of God, his exposure of the absurdity of creating beings designed for
evil intent, makes the others uncomfortable and they leave him alone to contemplate the ocean in
solitude.
Mortmain presents his truth through spoken dialogue. Like Pirazeni’s aforementioned
dream-prisons, the speech reflects the labyrinths of his heart, although instead of abstract
imagery he uses speech. Like the prints, the words create such a sense of unease in the other
pilgrims that they leave, both literally walking away and also intellectually avoiding
uncomfortable ideas. The poem implicitly asks: if what Mortmain says frightens people into
leaving, and Melville includes a warning against reading it, is Mortmain the most “correct” of all
the characters? Reading with polyphonic poetics in mind, we can safely answer no. Mortmain
isn’t more correct than anyone else. Rather, the poem suggests that instead of dialogue, which
leads to confusion and agony, perhaps turning away from other’s uncomfortable truths, which
might disrupt foundational beliefs, is the only available comfort to earnest spiritual seekers.

The Prodigal
The pilgrims of Clarel either continue to hold onto their beliefs without reason, or the
foundations of their beliefs are lost, resulting in despair. This is explored in depth when
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analyzing the issue of heroes in the poem later. Before that, however, it’s worth analyzing how
the poem teases out the possibility of revelation while at the same time warning the reader, as in
the previous section, that a revelation is not coming. Analyzing the canto “The Prodigal”
demonstrates that so long as there is desire for spiritual certainty, certainty will not arrive.
Although “The Prodigal” is the only dialogue that ends complacency, it is immediately
undone through the following cantos. The dialogue consists of Clarel and a young Lyonese
“Prodigal” who are sharing a room for the night before heading back to Jerusalem. Their
dialogue moves from Clarel’s praise of the Prodigal’s singing to a discussion of bodily pleasure.
The Prodigal’s musings on a homoerotic encounter with “A young Peruvian” (IV.xxvi.51) and
his conviction to “weigh not things too curious” (IV.xxvi.63) causes Clarel to wonder “Am I too
curious in my mind; / And, baffled in the vain employ, / Forgoing many an easy joy?”
(IV.xxvi.69-71). The Prodigal goes on to reinterpret Hebrew Scriptures literally, viewing the
Song of Solomon as a praise of erotic love that justifies sexuality within religious belief. This
unorthodox but literal reading causes Clarel to panic (IV.xxvi.179-190). The Prodigal then goes
on to sexualize Jewish women, arguing that
“There is no tress
Can thrall one like a Jewess’s.
A Hebrew husband, Hebrew-wed,

Is wondrous faithful, it is said;
Which needs be true; for, I suppose,
As bees are loyal to the rose,
So men to beauty.” (IV.xxvi.216-222)
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The Prodigal sexualizes the biblical Esther and argues that Christian monarchs enjoy sexual
freedom (IV.xxvi.225-231). The narrator interjects: “Clarel looked down: was he depressed?”
(IV.xxvi.234). The Prodigal goes on praising hedonism over the spiritual musings. Then Clarel
looks at the Prodigal and
He marked the clustering hair
Which on the bright and shapely brow
At middle part grew scantly low:
Ruch, tumbled, chestnut hood of curls,
Like to a Polynesian girl’s,
Who, inland eloping with her lover… (IV.xxvi.252-257)
Kevorkian suggests that the Prodigal proves that “Clarel needs to get out of his head, the realm
of irresolvable concepts, and find, in poetry and through poetry, embodiment” (38), this is true.
Indeed, more than any other passage, the length and form of this canto exposes Clarel’s biggest
flaw: his over-thinking; reiterating that Clarel must “unlearn.” But the following two cantos
undue this canto’s conclusiveness. After their discussion, Clarel dreams that he is standing
“Betwixt a Shushan and a sand; / The Lyonese [the Prodigal] was lord of one” and he feels the
Prodigal’s “Clasping arms which would detain / His heart from each ascetic range”
(IV.xxvi.311-312, 316-317). When Clarel awakes, the Prodigal is gone, singing a song while

wandering away. Abandoning Clarel, yet another homoerotic encounter goes unfulfilled.
Although the potential homoerotic encounter is gone, the Prodigal’s advice, to enjoy
pleasure and avoid intellectual musings, lingers. The following canto, “By Parapet,” features
Derwent monologuing about the beauty of the Prodigal, describing him as “feminine”
(IV.xxvii.6) before sensually musing that when talking to the Prodigal,
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“My thoughts were wandering away,
Though never once mine eyes did stray,
He did so pleasingly beguile
To keep them fixed upon his form:
Such harmony pervades his warm
Soft outline.” (IV.xxvii.14-19)
This praise of the Prodigal’s beauty culminates in a comparison of the Prodigal to the Greek god
Bacchus: “the sweet shape! / Young Bacchus, mind ye, not the old:” (IV.xxvii.24-25). Derwent’s
sudden praise of a boy’s beauty, and his comparison of his desire for the youth to the seduction
of Erigone by Bacchus, a story wherein in Bacchus becomes a grape and impregnates Erigone
without her knowing it, causes Clarel to wonder, “This man [Derwent]— / May Christian true
such temper wish? / His happiness seems paganish” (IV.xxvii.34-36). That the pleasures of the
flesh turn even the priestly Derwent to lustful thoughts and pagan morality frightens Clarel. The
disconnect between human desire and rational belief causes him to quickly renounce the
hedonistic lifestyle endorsed by the Prodigal. Derwent’s inconsistency teaches Clarel that no
religious view can coexist with individual drives, be those sexual or moral. Eventually a creed or
belief, such as Derwent’s Anglicanism, becomes inauthentic due to skepticism or non-biblical
sexual desires outside of one’s control. Against the Prodigal’s advice, Clarel understands he

cannot simply stop wondering about spiritual issues without relinquishing a natural drive within
himself: the desire for spiritual satisfaction and knowledge. The following canto further
reinforces this inauthenticity by twisting the entire context of the Prodigal’s character.
In the next canto, “David’s Well,” Clarel learns from a Russian who travelled with the
Prodigal that the Prodigal lied to Clarel about his origin. The Russian reveals, “Evade he cannot,
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no, nor hide. / Learn, he who whiled the hour for you, / His race supplied the theme: a Jew!”
(IV.xxviii.126-128). Instead of the care-free youth Clarel supposed he was, the Prodigal is
actually a runaway, torn between the tension of being both “melt in, [and] not be separate”
(IV.xxviii.148) from his Jewish upbringing. To avoid the problem altogether, he runs away,
embracing a hedonistic lifestyle. Clarel reflects, “The Lyonese, to sense so dear, / Nor less from
faith a fugitive—” (IV.xxix.85-86). For the first time in the poem, Clarel gets angry: “the student
felt the reign / Of reveries vague, which yet could mar, / Crossed by a surging element
(IV.xxviii.156-159). Realizing that people like Derwent and the Prodigal adopt contradictory
truths to avoid adherence to one creed, Clarel discovers there’s no comforting religious belief
that also gives biological drives and emotions liberty. Forcing new beliefs against religious
anxiety is a coping mechanism, not a beneficial truth. The Prodigal, teasing out a revelation, is
then revealed to not provide answers that the poem seeks, but further complicate them.

Heroes, or Lack Thereof
One of the most discussed issues of Clarel is the apparent lack of heroes despite its length
and scope. The hunt for heroes in Clarel is vain. The poem undermines the notion of any
individual attaining a truth worth sharing. Monomaniacal pilgrims, though most firm in their

beliefs, die by mysterious suicides; Nehemiah, a fundamentalist Christian, dies during a mystical
vision during his sleep that leads him to drown in the sea. Mortmain apparently kills himself
through starvation because “his brain a tocsin-bell / Overburdensome for citadel / Whose base
was shattered” (III.32.40-2) caused him to go insane. Yet even the most “healthy-minded”
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religious characters are examples of how no worldview, helpful to oneself or others, gives true
existential comfort so long as a lingering surety of reasons exist for their beliefs.
We’ve analyzed how the Prodigal, far from a hero, is another example of inauthentic
belief. Kevorkian writes, “The form of Clarel’s awakening [after the Prodigal leaves him] recalls,
in its actions and punctuated cadences, messianic words of healing: ‘Rise, take up thy bed, and
walk’ (John 5:8 KJV)” (43). Aside from ignoring the two cantos which bring Clarel to
disillusionment with both Derwent and the Prodigal, Kevorkian also looks beyond the text by
arguing that “the Prodigal initiates in the young pilgrim an awakening that will serve him well as
he ages” (35). But knowing that Clarel’s journey ends in complete despair, this interpretation,
that a hypothetical older Clarel will embrace hedonism, isn’t textually grounded. It’s more
helpful to think of the interaction with the Prodigal as another dialogic confrontation which
undermines spiritual presuppositions, only to later bring disappointment to the undermining
beliefs themselves.
Rolfe is most often designated the hero of Clarel. However, Rolfe’s ending reveals that
although his beliefs are admirable, the reasoning behind those admirable beliefs is blinded by
idealism and certainty. Knapp writes that Melville expresses “his own thoughts…in Rolfe” (89),
and similarly Bezanson notes, “The general contours of Rolfe’s appearance, manner, speech, and
mind, bear surprising resemblance to the outward image of Melville that letters and biographical

data of the period 1845-1851 suggest” (“Introduction” lxxxv). Potter, a proponent of the RolfeMelville theory, summarizes this theory of connecting Rolfe to Melville: “Rolfe, the true hero of
the poem, confesses his doubt even as he openly reverses the religion, laments its loss, and
relentlessly pursues answers” (206). If Rolfe is the hero, then a democratic optimism infused
with philosophical skepticism would reign triumphant as the ideal worldview. While Rolfe is
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certainly one of the more charitable figures in the poem given his nuanced respect towards
theism and atheism, his humanism leads to un unwinding of his beliefs.33
In the final book of the poem, Rolfe loses the foundation of his ecumenical humanism.
Rolfe suggests to the pilgrims that communist class conflict can be avoided by a “firm founding
of the state” (IV.xxi.100), that is, a solid democratic system. This hope for non-violent social
change prompts the pessimistic Ungar to respond.34 Ungar, a Confederate civil-war veteran,
disillusioned with America, now abhors slavery, democracy, modern industrialization, and while
a Christian, argues that “Churches as worldly as the state” dominate culture (IV.10.166). Instead,
he yearns, paradoxically, for either a return to the feudalism of the middle ages, or a communist
revolution. In response to Rolfe’s democratic idealism, Ungar argues democratic governments,
valuing enlightenment-era ideals, create “Man disennobled—brutalized / By popular science—
Atheized / Into a smatterer—” (IV.xxi.139-141). Overwhelmed by the persuasiveness of Ungar’s
arguments, Rolfe, usually calm and collected, uncharacteristically bursts into despair, crying,
“Oh, oh!” (IV.xxi.142). Against Rolfe’s cries, Ungar finishes his speech on the wickedness of
modern society, specifically its industrial advances and racism, saying “May on your vast plains
shame the race / In the dark Ages of Democracy” (IV.xxi.147-148), calling out the hypocrisy of
the “firm states” which Rolfe hopes for. For the rest of the poem, Rolfe refuses to engage in
discussions, realizing he’s lost his idealism because its source came from a faith in democracy to

unify humanity, despite its multitudinous nature, without violence. Two cantos after Ungar’s

I’m not concerned with whether or not Rolfe resembles Melville in manners or beliefs. I mention these
readings to point out that the character scholars most attach to Melville is almost universally declared the
hero of the poem.
33

Although this critical canto is discussed by Potter and Knapp, neither discuss Rolfe’s role in the
dialogue. No reading of the poem I’ve found mentions Rolfe’s response, or the affect on his character,
presented in this canto.
34
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speech, “Twilight,” Rolfe makes his final speaking appearance. However, instead of engaging
with Derwent in dialogue, Rolfe’s responses, usually loquacious, are no longer than three words.
Derwent discusses his disdain for Ungar’s pessimism, to which Rolfe, indicating Ungar, replies
curtly, “‘He’s wise’” (IV.xxiv.32). When Derwent raves, contra Ungar, about the wonders of the
natural world, such as the beauty of birds, Rolfe responds, without a trace of his characteristic
wit or investigative interest, “‘Ay, birds’” (IV.xxiv.29). Persuaded by the overt-pessimism of
Ungar, and accepting that an ideal democracy is an illusion, Rolfe ends the pilgrimage in quiet
despair.
Derwent’s inner conflict between Anglican priesthood and homosexuality demonstrate
the inability to reconcile multiple beliefs with one’s personal constitutions.35 While on the
surface quite cheerful, Derwent nonetheless experiences the inability of authentically accepting
any belief without simultaneously sacrificing his selfhood. Much like his attraction to the
Prodigal, a contradictory combination of Grecian pederasty and the expected sexuality of an
Anglican priest, Derwent’s continual syncretization of new ideas with old ideas creates an
inauthentic self.
What becomes of Rolfe and Derwent is unknown. After returning to Jerusalem they leave
Clarel. In response the narrator only comments, “the world is rent / With partings” (IV.xxxii.15-

35

Berthold, as mentioned earlier, suggests Derwent is the hero of the poem. This runs counter to scholars
who dismiss his optimism as naive, but Berthold rightly points out that Derwent brings, soothing
discourse” to the poem which allows readers to “perform the democratic thinking essential to adopting a
viable moral code in uncertain times” (140). Derwent is certainly more enjoyable to read; the few
instances of humor in the poem often spring from his wit.Yet Derwent himself, though unaware of it,
demonstrates that his syncretization of new sciences, theologies, and philosophies, make him a believer of
so many truths so as to really possess none. Additionally, in response to criticism, Derwent is dismissive.
Rolfe criticizes his optimism by arguing that religions and civilizations are getting worse while
industrialization advances technology, The rank world prospers; but alack! / Eden nor Athens shall come
back” (II.viii.35-36). Rolfe s ideas trouble Derwent but he dismisses Rolfe, Pathetic grows thou,
Derwent said: / And lightly, as in leafy glade, / Lightly he in the saddle sat” (II.viii.42-44).
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16). Beyond the text of the poem, one cannot say whether Derwent will recognize his
contradictory beliefs or Rolfe will regain his idealism. Like Clarel, who disappears into an alley,
the future of these characters is not hinted by the poem. The fate of these characters is left to the
reader.
Clarel reaches no conclusions. No holy pilgrimage or dialogical investigation provides
truth. A reader might wonder if Clarel is a meaningless poem. Quite the opposite. Thematically,
the inconclusiveness is not a call to “read between the lines” and find hope amidst despair, but
instead, like Plato’s aporetic dialogues, push the reader to confront their own beliefs. If any
wisdom is found in Clarel, it is a negative wisdom like Ecclesiastes. Kohelet’s saying “For in
much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow” (Eccl. 1:18
KJV) is mopped into: much knowledge lessens the capacity for belief. Any foundational force of
belief can and will eventually collapse in the face of someone else’s contradictory belief or the
advance of rational science. Instead of enlightening, dialogue serves as a reminder of how much
an individual does not know. The only character to recognize this is Clarel, whose tragic end,
while remaining tragic, nonetheless achieves his goal of “unlearning” by finally relinquishing
any foundations of certainty.

Clarel’s End and Clarel’s End
Clarel’s journey causes the loss of religious beliefs possessed at the beginning of the
poem. When he learns of Ruth’s death, Clarel bursts out in despair, railing against the Jewish
religion and its laws, “And ye—your tribe—’twas ye denied / Me access to this virgin’s side / In
bitter trial: take my curse!” (IV.xxx.97-99). Clarel, like a passive Ahab, cries, “O blind, blind,
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barren universe! / Now I am like a bough torn down, / And I must wither, cloud or sun!”
(IV.xxx.100-102) ultimately concluding that his “Conviction is not gone / Though faith’s gone”
(IV.xxx.126-127). The word “Conviction” here is intentionally vague. It could refer to his lost
Christian faith, or it could refer to an ethical conviction that, despite the loss of Christian faith,
the ethical principles of that religion persist. However, this conviction, in the context of the poem
as a whole, is likely the broader conviction that some ultimate truth exists beyond human
comprehension. Without the ability to will himself into a faith that describes this truth, Clarel
proceeds to indifferently walk away from the crowds of suffering travelers along the Via Crucis.
Unlike Ahab’s active vengeance against the inscrutable pasteboard mask, Clarel’s rebellion
ignores the divine.
The penultimate canto “Via Crucis” is a carnivalesque vision in a humorless mode.
Instead of using the space to express cultural difference or reverse hierarchies, the carnival of the
Via Crucis follows
…the way
Tradition claims to be the one
Trod on that Friday far away
By Him [Jesus]. (IV.xxxiv.18-20)
Pilgrims of various backgrounds, Buddhists, Jews, Muslim women, and Christians, all walk in

silence,“ Cross-bearers all, alike they tend / And follow, slowly follow on” (IV.xxxiv.43-44).
Clarel, watching, feels the burden of the ten-day pilgrimage, but decides not to follow the
pilgrims united through suffering. Instead, he comments, ‘“They wire the world—far under sea /
They talk; but never comes to me / A message from beneath the stone” (IV.xxxiv. 51-53). Clarel
acknowledges the ubiquity of suffering, but hears no “message” to encourage him to accept this
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fact. Clarel then moves on: “Dusked Olivet he leaves behind, / And, taking now a slender wind, /
Vanishes in the obscurer town” (IV.xxxiv.54-56). Clarel’s pilgrimage ends as a successful antibildungsroman, wherein he “unlearns” all he thought he knew. Yothers’ reading, mentioned at
the beginning of this chapter, is confounding because the phrase “Sacred Uncertainty,” which
sounds agnostic, is specifically not agnostic according to Yothers (214). Yothers' and Potter’s
argument that the “intersympathy of creeds” is a “mystical experience of the reality of religious
pluralism” (Sacred 178) is not textually grounded. Clarel notes the sufferers but then walks a
separate path. Clarel, knowing that even Rolfe fell into despair because of his humanism,
acknowledges the Via Crucis as a symbol for the ubiquity of suffering, but Clarel does not join
them. Joining the sorrowful path every religion follows, would mean believing in suffering as the
unifying solution to unbelief. The poem dismisses democracy, humanism, and universalism as
foundational reasons for belief, and the poem ends by adding suffering to the mix. Suffering does
not justify belief.
The epilogue of Clarel functions as an agnostic credo. Instead of a creed affirming belief
or providing guidelines to faith, the epilogue asks unknowable questions and provides no
answers. It begins with the central crisis of the poem summed up in a question: “If Luther’s day
expand to Darwin’s year, / Shall that exclude the hope—foreclose the fear?” (IV.xxxv.1-2). This
strangely worded question asks if religion and science will join forces to bring certainty and

peace or only further confound. Instead of answering, the narrator muses that despite “all the
claims our times avow” (IV.xxxv.3) still “comes Despair, whom not her calm may cow, / And
coldly on that adamantine brow / Scrawls undeterred his bitter pasquinade” (IV.xxxv.5-7).
Although there are scientific advances, despair endures and performs a “bitter pasquinade,” or a
public lampooning of the sciences which humans hold dear. Despite despair, however,
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Faith (who from the scrawl indigent turns)
With blood warm oozing from her wounded trust,
Inscribes even on her shards of broken urns
The sign o ’the cross. (IV.xxxv.8-11)
Faith, even if it is bloody and broken, persists in modern society. The narrator asks “dumb
Nature” (IV.xxxv.22) why the increase of knowledge only furthers despair and weakens faith.
Again, there is no answer. The narrator argues that since there is no path to truth, those people
“Who in life’s pilgrimage have baffled striven— / Even death may prove unreal at the last, / And
stoics be astounded into heaven” (IV.xxxv.24-26). A glimmer of hope: there may exist some
ultimate truth. There is no certainty of this, however. The narrator argues that if we don’t know
the truth, hope in the truth’s existence will persist. Three consequences of willing oneself into
faith appear in the poem: it doesn’t assuage suffering, it produces monomaniacs or
fundamentalists, and it causes an inauthentic relationship with the self. What purpose does faith
serve? While faith persists, its benefits wane in the increasingly scientific and globalized world.
The final eight lines of the epilogue encourage Clarel to “keep thy heart, though yet but
ill-resigned” (IV.xxxv.27) because “like a swimmer rising from the deep…/ Emerge
thou mayst from the last whelming sea, / And prove that death but routs life into victory”
(IV.xxxv.30, 33-34; emphasis mine). The ending echoes the final lines of Plato’s aporetic

Theaetetus, where Socrates encourages his interlocutor, despite their failure to discover what
knowledge is, that "you will be modest and not think you know what you don't know” (399).
Humility is a result of their failure (and probable continual failures) to reach true notions of
ideals. Adopting truths without sufficient cause hinders humility, and only Clarel leaves the
poem aware of the necessity of a truly agnostic methodology in order to begin living a humble,
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existentially authentic, and ethical life. The poem demonstrates that ignorance is indeed bliss and
blind faith gives life purpose, but the costs of ignorance and unreasoned faith are reiterated over
and over: monomania, inauthentic selfhood, and despair. Although Clarel’s end is still tragic,
losing the capacity for the Christian belief he sought to revive, he nonetheless avoids the larger
tragedy of unreasonable belief that could collapse at any moment as science and political thought
continues to shift and undermine spirituality.
Moby-Dick captures the cheer of turning away from orthodoxy: homoerotic bonds,
laughter, and pragmatic truths collide to demonstrate the joy of life without dogmatic certainty.
Clarel, however, shows that these hopes are fantasies. The cheerfulness Ishmael finds could only
exist on an isolated boat away from society. Clarel’s journey through the Holy Land displays,
rather than teaches, that freedom from orthodoxy does not necessarily bring comfort.
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